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The high cost of workers" compensation' premiums is devastating
California's economy by driving many in-state employers out of business
or to other states in search of greener pastures.2 The net effect is a
reduction in the number of out-of-state employers who are willing to
relocate to California.3 Workers' compensation premiums, which are the
prices employers must pay for workers' compensation insurance, have
increased so rapidly that some employers have been forced into
bankruptcy.4 Businesses which must scale down because of economic
factors other than high workers' compensation premiums likewise find
their problems compounded when many laid off employees file workers'
compensation claims following termination, usually claiming stress as the
1. See CAL. LAB. CODE §§ 3201-5278 (West 1989 & Supp. 1993) (setting forth the scope, operation,
proceedings, and coverage of California's workers' compensation and insurance laws).
2. LITTLE HOOVER COMMISSION, WORKERS' COMPENSATION-CONTAINING THE COSTS, at 24-26 (Feb.
1993) [hereinafter CONTAINING THE COSTS] (citing numerous successful businesses which are either shutting
down or considering leaving California because of the high cost of workers' compensation).
3. Id. In the past five years, 669 manufacturing plants left the state, resulting in a loss of 100,000 jobs,
Id. at 26. The main reason for this departure was said to be California's workers' compensation system. Id.; see
LITTLE HOOVER COMMISSION, A REVIEW OF THE CURRENT PROBLEMS IN CAUFORNIA'S WORKERS'
COMPENSATION SYSTEM, at 13-14 (Mar. 1988) [hereinafter CURRENT PROBLEMS] (stating that the high cost of
premiums has had a negative impact on the perception of California's business climate, and may reduce the
number of companies willing to relocate to California); see also Dan Weikel, companies Lured From Tarnished
Golden State; Econom3:" Recruiters Target Businesses In O.C. And Elsewhere hI California Frustrated By
Increasing Costs And Regulations, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 9, 1992, Orange County Edition, at Al, available in
LEXIS, Nexis Library, LAT File (reporting that California's liberal stress claim laws are part of the reason for
insurance premiums that are three to four times higher than in other areas of the country), A study by the
Economic Development Corporation of Los Angeles County found that approximately 260 Southern California
companies had expanded into other states or relocated outside California since 1989. Id. A statewide survey of
1,462 firms conducted by the California Business Roundtable indicated that one-third of those polled had plans
to either move or expand operations out of state. Id. But see Stuart Silverstein, Fraud Disables State's Workers'
Comp Program, L.A. TIMEs, Aug. 23, 1992, at DI, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, LAT File [hereinafter
Fraud Disables] (reporting that organized labor and some economists feel that the recession, and not rampant
workers' compensation costs, are the reason that many employers are leaving the state or going out of business).
4. CONTAINING TE COSTS, supra note 2, at 8; see id. at 25 (citing the closure of a popular restaurant
in Newhall, California on May 12, 1992 as an example of the deleterious effects of rampant increases in
workers' compensation costs). The owner of the 27-year-old restaurant stated that 14 other restaurants in the
same chain had shut down since 1989 as a result of rising workers' compensation costs. Id.; see also infra note
6 and accompanying text (discussing the role of post-termination stress claims in the rising cost of workers'
compensation insurance premiums).
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compensable work-related injury.5 In fact, the number of stress injuries
reported by employers to the Department of Industrial Relations has
increased seventy percent in just five years.6 When an employer cuts back
on employees, the logical assumption is that the reduction in payroll will
yield a refund on the required workers' compensation premium.7 Instead,
an inordinate amount of post-termination stress claims act to raise the cost
to the insurance carrier, who then simply passes this increase on to the
employer through higher premiums.8 Therefore, an employer attempting
to conserve capital by terminating employees may actually incur an
increase in capital outlay to cover the higher insurance premium resulting
from the additional workers' compensation claims.9 Rather than staying
in California to fight the rising workers' compensation costs, many
companies are simply taking their businesses elsewhere.1"
While California's $11 billion workers' compensation system is one of
the largest and most expensive in the United States, the benefits actually
5. See, e.g., CONTAINING THE COSTS, supra note 2, at 80 (recounting the experience of a Southern
California plant which laid off 119 employees, 115 of whom subsequently filed mental and other workers'
compensation claims); Fraud Disables, supra note 3, at D1 (discussing a common scenario for workers'
compensation fraud cited by insurance industry investigators in which: (1) Workers who have been.recently laid-
off, or who need money for other reasons, see an advertisement for a workers' compensation "hot line," or are
recruited by a pitchman for a doctor or lawyer (known as a "capper"); (2) the hot line or capper refers these
workers to a lawyer to help them file a workers' compensation claim; (3) the lawyer then sends the workers to
a doctor or psychologist who performs costly medical-legal evaluations to justify the claim, whether or not it
is legitimate; (4) the doctor or psychologist refers the workers to other doctors and health care specialists,
including chiropractors and physical therapists, to further run up the medical bills; (5) the bills are submitted
to workers' compensation insurance companies, which decide whether to pay or challenge the claims; and (6)
the resultant cost to insurers for either paying for or fighting fraudulent claims causes the imposition of higher
charges on employers who buy their workers' compensation policies).
6. Howard Fine, Workers' Comp Means Trouble For Anaheim Firm, 15 ORANGE COUNTY Bus. J. 3,
§ I at 1 (Jan. 20, 1992) [hereinafter Anaheim Finn] (citing a recent study which found that the number of
employer-reported stress injuries had increased from 6,800 in 1986 to over 11,000 in 1991). Workers'
compensation experts estimate that the actual number of stress claims is almost 40,000 per year, since many
stress claims are litigated by the employer, and are therefore unreported to the Department of Industrial
Relations. Id.; see Mental Stress Claims in California Workers' Compensation--Incidence, Costs and Trends,
CWCI RESEARCH NOTES, CALIFORNIA WORKERS' COMPENSATION INSTITUTE, June 1990 at 2 (finding that one
of the reasons that 73% of mental stress claims filed under 1985 policies were not reported to the Department
of Industrial Relations was the practice of not reporting claims which the employer is litigating).
7. See CAL. INS. CODE §§ 11730-41 (West 1989 & Supp. 1993) (including payroll as a factor in
determining the premium rate for Workers' Compensation insurance).
8. See, e.g., Anahein Finn, supra note 6, at 1 (reporting that, while Century Laminators had expected
a $175,000 refund in their workers' compensation premiums due to the 30% reduction in personnel, the company
was instead required to pay an additional $25,000 in reserves to cover the inordinate amount of post-termination
stress claims).
9. Id.
10. California Business Climate Surney, CALIFORNIA BUSINESS ROUNDTABLE (Nov. 1991); CONTAINING
THE COSTS, supra note 2, at 24-26.
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received by injured workers are among the lowest in the nation." This
disparity is attributed to the pervasive amount of fraud which is allegedly
being committed in virtually every sector of the system. 12 In fact, it is
estimated that twenty percent of all claims are fraudulent. 3
This Comment discusses a potentially effective anti-fraud technique
currently being used by some insurance companies: the civil cause of
action available under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organization
Act (RICO).14 This Comment also contrasts the policy behind civil RICO
with that of antitrust law, 5 and posits the theory that the antitrust
exemption currently enjoyed by workers' compensation insurance
providers, combined with immunity from liability under civil RICO,
1I. Grant Thornton, Grant Thornton, Manufacturing Clinates Study (Aug. 1990) (stating that California
ranks 47th out of 50 states in the level of benefits actually paid to injured workers); Fremont Anti-Fraud
Campaign Leads to First Criminal Indictments, BUS. WIRE, Apr. 22, 1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library,
BWIRE File (stating that California ranks third nationwide in per capita workers' compensation premiums paid
by employers, and that fraudulent workers' compensation claims are a significant factor in California's low
ranking for benefits actually paid to injured employees); see CALIFORNIA WORKERS' COMPENSATION INSTITUTIE,
BULLETIN (June 3, 1987), il CURRENT PROBLEMS, supra note 3, at 19 (reporting that during the period between
1977 and 1986, litigation costs for workers' compensation claims increased 304%, forensic medical costs
increased 224%, and the cost in direct overhead to deliver one dollar of benefits rose from 32 cents to 52 cents).
Between 1986 and 1991, the cost of medical care under California's workers' compensation system averaged
an annual increase of 11.4% per worker compared to an average annual increase of 7.7% for U.S. consumer
medical care expenses. Fraud Disables, supra note 3, at DI. The U.S. rate of inflation averaged 4.5% annually,
rising only one-half as fast as the average annual increase in California workers' compensation medical costs
per worker. Id.
12. COUNCIL ON CALIFORNIA COMPETITIVENESS, CALIFORNIA'S JOBS AND FUTURE (Apr. 1992) at 22,
in CONTAINING THE COSTS, supra note 2, at 85 (stating that system-wide fraud deprives deserving workers of
benefits, and deprives employers of the lower premiums that could be possible if money were not illegally
siphoned away from the system). According to some estimates, between 20% and 30% of employee claims are
fraudulent. Id. at 78-79.
13. CONTAINING THE COSTS, supra note 2, at 78; Los Angeles Times Rejects Ad Warning Agaist
Worker's Comp Fraud, BUS. WIRE, Jan. 21, 1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, BWIRE File; see
Assemblyman Bill Jones (R-Fresno), Untie This Noose On Our Economy" Until Workers' Compensation Is
Reformned, Businesses Will Avoid California In Droves, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 7, 1992, at B7, available in LEXIS,
Nexis Library, LAT File (comparing California's workers' compensation system, which has tripled in cost over
the last decade, with that of Oregon, which has reduced its rates by 10%, and noting that California is at a clear
disadvantage in both keeping jobs in the state, and attracting new businesses to the state, partially because of
the corrupt and unfair workers' compensation system); Peter Kerr, The Price of Health: Employee Fraud - A
Special Report; Vast Amount of Fraud Discovered In Workers' Compensation System, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 29,
1991, LATE Edition, at I available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, NYT File [hereinafter Employee Fraud] (stating
that nationwide workers' compensation insurance costs are being driven up by billions of dollars a year due to
fraud and exaggerated claims); Fraud Disables, supra note 3, at DI (reporting that some insurance company
investigators estimate that fraud and bill-padding by doctors, psychologists and chiropractors are so common
that they account for more than 25% of the money paid on claims in California).
14. 18 U.S.C.S. §§ 1961-68 (1991 & Supp. 1993); see infra notes 304-328 and accompanying text
(discussing the civil RICO suits brought by Zenith Insurance Company against various medical care providers
for fratdulent and exaggerated claims).
15. Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C.S. § 1 (1985 & Supp. 1993); 15 U.S.C.S. § 15 (1985) (§ 4 of the
Clayton Act); 15 U.S.C.S. § 26 (1991) (§ 16 of the Clayton Act).
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creates a gap in the law which opens the door for workers' compensation
insurers to abuse the system with little or no risk of significant legal
repercussions.
16
Part I describes how California's workers' compensation system
engenders fraudulent practices in every sector of the system and discusses
the anti-fraud measures currently in place, including certain aspects of the
workers' compensation reform legislation signed by Governor Pete'Wilson
on July 16, 1993.17 Part II compares the divergent policies of civil RICO
and antitrust laws, and discusses the disparity in their current application
within the workers' compensation system.18 Part III recounts the recent
controversial lawsuits between Zenith Insurance Company and certain
claimants, medical care providers, and attorneys in which allegations of
RICO' 9 and antitruse violations were traded.2' Finally, Part IV
presents the legal ramifications of the use of civil RICO in California's
workers' compensation system, and suggests that workers' compensation
insurers currently enjoy a distinct legal advantage that presents dangers
which warrant a closer look by both the judiciary and the California
Legislature.22
I. CALIFORNIA'S WORKERS' COMPENSATION SYSTEM:
A BREEDING GROUND FOR FRAUD
In the early part of the twentieth century, the enactment of workers'
compensation laws drastically changed the method by which job-related
personal injuries were compensated.23 The age-old axiom that people
were responsible for injuries due to their own fault was abandoned in favor
of limited compensation to an injured employee, or the employee's
dependents in the case of death, without regard to who was at fault.24 The
underlying rationale for this change was the necessity of assuring prompt
16. See infra notes 361-379 and accompanying text.
17. See infra notes 23-179 and accompanying text.
18. See infra notes 189-303 and accompanying text.
19. See Zenith Ins. Co. v. American Psychometric Consultants, Inc., No. 91-6308, at 7-29 (C.D. Cal. filed
Nov. 18, 1991) [hereinafter Zenith Complaint] (alleging RICO violations by the defendants).
20. See Princeton Medical Corp., et al., v. Zenith Ins. Co., No. 91-6866, at 7-11 (C.D. Cal. filed Dec.
17, 1991) [hereinafter Princeton Complaint] (alleging antitrust violations by the defendants).
21. See infra notes 304-360 and accompanying text (discussing the allegations set forth in these two
suits).
22. See hiifra notes 361-379 and accompanying text.
23. CURRENT PROBLEMS, supra note 3, at 3.
24. Id.
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payment of benefits to a person who was injured during the course of
employment without the need to litigate every claim.' Concurrently, the
liability of the employer was limited to a specified amount of
compensation.26
California law now mandates that every employer provide workers'
compensation insurance for all employees.27 California's workers'
compensation system is largely administered by employers or their
insurance carriers, with the State assuming only a supervisory role in
settling disputes. 28 There are various conventional methods by which an
employer can meet the requirement of ensuring that employees receive
payment of workers' compensation benefits.29 The most common source
of workers' compensation insurance is through the non-profit State
Compensation Insurance Fund (SCIF).3" Others assure that their
employees will receive payment of workers' compensation benefits by
either purchasing insurance from a private insurer authorized by the SCIF,
or by self-insuring.3" Since California's system is designed to assure that
benefits are provided to all workers who are injured on the job, an
employer wishing to self-insure must obtain formal consent by the Director
25. Id. The main purpose of industrial compensation is to ensure that an injured employee and dependents
of the employee have adequate means of subsistence while the employee is unable to work. Id. Another purpose
of industrial compensation is to bring about the employee's recovery as soon as possible in order to hasten return
to the ranks of productive labor. San Diego Transit Corp. v. Workers' Compensation Appeals Bd., 95 Cal. App.
3d 693, 701, 157 Cal. Rptr. 216, 220 (1979) (quoting Moyer v. Workmen's Comp. Appeals Bd., 10 Cal. 3d 222,
233 (1973)).
26. STANFORD D. HERLICK, CALIFORNIA WORKERS' COMPENSATION HANDBOOK at 11 (1988).
27. CAL. INS. CODE § 3700(a)-(d) (West Supp. 1993) (requiring every employer, except the State, to
secure payment of compensation benefits for employees by one or more specified means).
28. Herlick, supra note 26, at 1-2.
29. See CAL INS. CODE § 3700(a)-(d) (West Supp. 1993) (requiring every employer, except the State,
to secure payment of compensation benefits for employees by one or more specified means).
30. CONTAINING TIlE COSTS, supra note 2, at II (stating that the SCIF is the largest workers'
compensation insurer in the State, covering approximately 21 percent of California's policyholders in 1990). The
SCIF is an independent state agency required to offer workers' compensation coverage to any employer in
California who meets specified minimum safety standards. Id.; see CAL. INS. CODE §§ 11770-11881 (West 1988
& Supp. 1993) (providing for the powers and duties of the State Compensation Insurance Fund); id. § 11870
(West 1988) (providing that the State, and various state agencies, may insure against liability with the State
Compensation Insurance Fund).
31. See CAL. INS. CODE § 3700(b)-(c) (West 1989) (setting forth methods by which employers may
secure a certificate of consent to self-insure, and excluding the State from this requirement); see also id. §
3300(a)-(d) (West 1989) (defining an employer as: (a) The State and every State agency; (b) each county, city,
district, and all public and quasi public corporations and public agencies therein; (c) every person including any
public service corporation, which has any natural person in service; and (d) the legal representative of any
deceased employer); id. § 3301 (West 1989) (excluding from the definition of employer: (a) Any person while
acting solely as the sponsor of a bowling team; and (b) any private, nonprofit organization while acting solely
as the sponsor of a person who, as a condition of sentencing by a superior or municipal court, is performing
services for the organization).
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of Industrial Relations.32 Self-insurance is only practical for public
agencies and large private employers because the self-insurance option
requires a minimum deposit of $220,000. 33
Recently enacted legislation provides an alternative to the conventional
methods of providing workers' compensation insurance. California Labor
Code section 3201.5 now allows building industry employers and
construction workers to sidestep the state workers' compensation system
altogether.34 Through collective bargaining, large construction industry
employers, or groups of smaller construction industry employers, are
allowed to negotiate an alternative workers' compensation system with
labor organizations. While this concept has been both praised and
criticized,36 it is too early to tell whether section 3201.5 signals the.
advent of a more efficient system or a coup for the construction industry.
Until recently, California's workers' compensation system was one of
the few systems in which insurance companies were guaranteed a profit,
thereby ensuring the solvency of all workers' compensation insurers.37
This guarantee of profitability was accomplished by establishing minimum
premium rates which could be charged to employers by various workers'
32. See id. § 3700(b) (,Vest Supp. 1993) (granting an employer the right to self-insure, so long as the
employer has secured from the Director of Industrial Relations a certificate of consent to self-insure, which is
given to an employer who has proven to the Director that he has the ability to self-insure, and to pay any
compensation that may become due to his employees); id. § 3701(a)-(g)(2) (West 1989) (establishing the
bonding and self-administration requirements for qualifying as a private self-insured employer). The minimum
deposit to secure the liabilities of a private self-insured employer is 125% of the estimated future liability for
compensation, plus 10% of the estimated future liability for payment of all administrative and legal costs relating
to the employer's self-insuring, so long as it is at least $220,000. Id. § 3701(a)-(b) (West 1989).
33. CONTAINING ThE COSTS, suipra note 2, at 8 (noting that private employers would have to expend a
minimum of $500,000 a year on workers' compensation in order for self-insurance to be a cost-effective option).
California has approximately 600,000 employers, 75% of whom buy private insurance or pay into the nonprofit
SCIF for insurance. Id. The remaining 25% are able to self-insure. Id.
34. See 1993 Cal. Legis. Serv. ch. 117, sec. 1, at 1038-39 (enacting CAL. LAB. CODE § 3201.5).
35. See id. (enacting CAL. LAB. CODE § 3201.5(a)(1)).
36. See Hallye Jordan, Workers' Comp Law Allows Private System, THE RECORDER, July 28, 1993, at
I (noting that proponents of Chapter 117 claim that it will reduce the cost of workers' compensation because
collective bargaining units would be able to shut out attorneys, doctors and vocational rehabilitation counselors,
all of whom drive up the costs of the workers' compensation system). But see id. (reporting that critics of the
new law are concerned that the collective bargaining system may result in the bargaining away of workers' rights
in order to secure a union contract). In a depressed construction market, workers will have little leverage in
negotiating agreements with potential employers, thus enabling employers to stack panels of medical-legal
evaluators and medical treatment providers with doctors more sympathetic to the employer than the worker. Id.
at 1, 6.
37. CONTAINING THE COSTS, supra note 2, at 8; see infra note 113 and accompanying text (noting that
California Insurance Code § 11732, which becomes effective January 1, 1995, eliminates this built-in profit
system in favor of a competitive system).
317
Pacific Law Journal / Vol. 25
compensation carriers. 3' The Workers' Compensation Insurance Rating
Bureau (WCIRB) 39 set these minimum premium rates, which included a
built-in profit and overhead percentage, by using a merit system."0 The
mandatory workers' compensation premium ultimately charged to a
particular employer was based on the amount of the employer's payroll for
employees4' covered by workers' compensation, the character of the
business or employment, and the casualty history or experience of the
individual employer.42 A higher premium was charged to those employers
who sustained a higher frequency of claims.43
In theory, this system was a viable method of expediting the
compensation of injured workers without the need for litigation. 44 In
practice, however, the infestation of fraud stopped the flow of benefits by
creating an adversarial climate in what was originally intended to be a
38. CAL. INS. CODE §§ 11730-41 (West 1988 & Supp. 1993) (setting forth the regulations governing the
determination and application of the merit system, under which workers' compensation premium rates are
determined). Once established, these minimum premium rates are then forwarded to the Department of Insurance
for approval; see id. §§ 11732-11732.1 (West 1988) (authorizing the Insurance Commissioner to approve a
classification of risks and premium rates, and a merit rating system relating to California workers' compensation
insurance).
39. The Workers' Compensation Insurance Rating Bureau is funded and operated by the workers'
compensation carriers, and is licensed by the Insurance Commissioner to periodically develop and recommend
rates for each of the more than 400 employment classifications, based on prior benefits and administrative costs.
Herlick, supra note 26, at 32.
40. CAL. INS. CODE §§ 11730-41 (West 1988 & Supp. 1993); see id. § 11730 (West 1988) (defining
merit rating as synonymous with schedule rating, which varies according to physical conditions). Merit rating
also means experience rating, in which the insured employer's previous experience in the California workers'
compensation system is used as a factor in raising or lowering the premium rate). Id.
41. See CAl.. LAB. CODE § 3351(a)-(f) (West 1989) (defining employee, for the purposes of workers'
compensation, as every person in the service of an employer under any appointment or contract of hire or
apprenticeship, express or implied, oral or written, whether lawfully or unlawfully employed); id. § 3352(a)-(m)
(West Supp. 1993) (excluding from the definition of employee, for the purposes of workers' compensation
coverage, various people who provide specified voluntary services, who participate in amateur sporting events
without receiving renumeration, or various law enforcement officers who are regularly employed by an adjoining
state but are deputized to work under the supervision of a California peace officer pursuant to specified
subdivisions of the California Penal Code). The existence of an employment relationship for workers'
compensation purposes depends on the factual nature of the relationship, and not on the public or private status
of the employer, or on any considerations of deterrence. Hoppmann v. Workers' Compensation Appeals Bd.,
226 Cal. App. 3d 1119, 1126, 277 Cal. Rptr. 116, 120-21 (1991).
42. See CAL. INS. CODE §§ 11730-41 (West 1988 & Supp. 1993) (setting forth the regulations governing
the determination and application of the merit system, under which workers' compensation premium rates are
determined).
43. Id.
44. See, e.g., Portillo v. G.T. Price Products, Inc., 131 Cal. App. 3d 285, 287, 182 Cal. Rptr. 291, 293
(1982) (declaring that the Workers' Compensation Act is designed to afford workers quick determination of their
claims for injury without regard to common-law questions of liability, negligence or fault).
1993 / Civil RICO, Antitrust, and Workers' Compensation Fraud
non-confrontational system.4 Neither prompt payment of benefits, nor
reduction in litigation are currently being achieved. 46 The many reasons
for the current system's failure to achieve the goal of adequately and fairly
redressing workers for injuries are subject to much debate.47 Nonetheless,
there seems to be universal agreement that a high incidence of fraud exists
within all sectors of California's workers' compensation system, which
drains an already inefficient system.
48
A. Common Types of Fraud
Despite reforms,49 unscrupulous employers, employees, medical
clinics, and attorneys are still making fortunes by defrauding California's
workers' compensation system." Employers sometimes simply fail to
provide workers' compensation insurance for employees." Those that do
45. See Mark D. Fefer & Sandra L. Kirsch, What To Do About Workers' Comp, FORTUNE MAG., June
29, 1992, at 80 (reporting that, in 1990, California workers collected $7 billion in compensation claims, but $1.5
billion was spent litigating disagreements); Fraud Disables, supra note 3, at D1 (quoting Rene Thomas Folse,
a workers' compensation lawyer who represents insurers, as estimating that two sides in a dispute in California
can run up $15,000 to $20,000 in medical-legal expenses just to dispense $2,000 worth of benefits to the injured
worker); infra notes 49-105 and accompanying text (discussing the pervasive fraud currently existing in the
workers' compensation system and how it is slowing the payment of benefits for legitimate claims).
46. See CURRENT PROBLEMS, supra note 3, at 3, 12-21 (discussing the persistent delays in payment of
benefits, as well as the increasing costs of litigation which continue to enervate the workers' compensation
system); Bertram Cohen, Workers' Compensation Psychiatric Clahns In California, ADDRESS TO THE SENATE
INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS COMMiTtEE, (Dec. 2, 1987), in CURRENT PROBLEMS, supra note 3, at 32 (noting that
the majority of psychiatric injury claims are tacitly denied by employers or" insurance carriers based on little
more than the fact that the claim is psychiatric in nature). This habitual denial of psychiatric claims precludes
the usual informal adjustment of claims and instead necessitates formal litigation. Id. Because psychiatric claims
commonly arise out of failed interpersonal relationships, and are therefore more complex and people-intensive
than other types of claims, the proceedings tend to take longer, resulting in a heavy drain on a system operating
with very limited resources. Id. at 40; see also CONTAINING THE COSTS, supra note 2, at 94 (citing a 1985 study
by the California Workers' Compensation Institute which found that 98% of stress claims were litigated, which
is more than twice the rate of litigation for other types of workers' compensation claims).
47. See generally CONTAINING THE COSTS, supra note 2 (discussing the many problems 6urrently
plaguing the state's *,orkers' compensation system, and urging immediate and widespread reforms).
48. Id.
49. See CAL. INS. CODE §§ 1877-1877.5 (West 1993) (creating the Workers' Compensation Insurance
Fraud Reporting Act and establishing requirements for when insurers are required to report workers'
compensation insurance fraud); Review of Selected 1991 California Legislation, 23 PAC. L.J. 709, 712 (1992)
(discussing the changes in the handling of fraudulent workers' compensation claims brought about by the
enactment of the Workers' Compensation Insurance Fraud Reporting Act).
50. Ron Gillmeister, Cracking Down: New Powers to Fight Comup Fraud Arhnig hIsurers in California,
CALIF. WORKERS' COMpEN 'SATION INST., at 58 (Apr. 1992) [hereinafter Cracking Down].
51. CONTAINING THE COSTS, supra note 2, at 80. When an employer fails to provide workers'
compensation insurance, injured workers can turn to the California Uninsured Employers Fund (CUEF), a fund
which is administered by the Director of Industrial Relations. See CAL. LAB CODE § 3716(a)-(d)(4) (West Supp.
1993) (creating the Uninsured Employers Fund and establishing its obligations of ensuring that injured workers
of illegally uninsured employers are not deprived of workers' compensation benefits). In a ten year period, the
319
Pacific Law Journal / Vol. 25
insure often understate their payroll, or conceal high risk jobs by
inappropriately classifying employees in lower risk categories, thus
reducing their insurance premiums.5 2 All participants in the widely-used
SCIF are negatively impacted by this type of employer fraud because this
fund operates as a general fund from which all claims are paid.53 By
understating the payroll for employees covered by workers' compensation,
an employer is able to pay less into the system. 54 While saving the
dishonest employer money, these underpayments debilitate the SCIF
because the amount of claims submitted by the employees is
disproportionately high in relation to the premium paid by the employer.55
The cost of paying these claims is passed on to all participants in the SCIF
through higher premiums, effectively increasing the premiums paid by
honest employers.56
Employees also defraud the system in numerous ways, such as filing
work-related claims for off-the-job injuries or collecting both
unemployment and workers' compensation payments.57 Employees might
amount of claims paid through this fund has increased more than 300 %, thus demonstrating the prevalence of
this type of employer fraud. CONTAINING THE COSTS, supra note 2, at 80-81.
52. Injured on the Job: Returning the Workers' compensation System to Ijured Workers and Their
Employers, STATE COMPENSATION INS. FUND, (Feb. 1992), cited in CONTAINING TE COSTS, supra note 2, at
80 [hereinafter Injured Workers]: see Fraud lisables, supra note 3, at DI (discussing the increases in workers'
compensation premiums for honest employers due to the oft-used practices of violating state law by simply not
buying workers' compensation insurance, or lying to insurers about the number of employees working in
hazardous jobs, thereby holding their rates down).
53. CONTAINING THE COSTS, supra note 2, at 80-82; CURRENT PROBLEMS, supra note 3, at 6, 21-22,
54. See CAL. INS. CODE §§ 11730-41 (West 1989 & Supp. 1993) (setting forth the regulations governing
the determination and application of the merit system, under which workers' compensation premium rates are
determined, and including the amount of the employer's payroll for covered employees as one of the factors
which determine the premium charged for workers' compensation coverage).
55. hljured Workers, supra note 52; see Constrnction Company Owners Arrested in $300,000 Workers'
Compensation hIsurance Fraud; Charges Are First Ever FiledAgainst An Employer, Bus. WRI', May 19, 1993,
available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, BWIRE File (reporting on the first criminal enforcement actions by the
Workers' Compensation Insurance Fraud Unit against Evian Construction, an employer charged with under-
reporting annual payroll and the number of employees). An audit by SCIF stated that Evian's annual payroll was
only slightly more than $356,000, however the construction firm had reported to the state Employment
Development Department that their payroll was over $1.1 million. Id.; State Compensation hIsurance Files RICO
Suit Against Former Policyholders, BUS. WIRE, July 20, 1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, BWIRE File
(reporting on a $6 million suit filed against a group of individuals and corporations who had allegedly
misrepresented the number of workers under their employment, the amount of annual payroll earned by the
workers, the nature and type of work performed, prior workers' compensation premiums, and employee claims
for work-related injuries); RICO Suit Judgentent in Workers' Conp Fraud Case; State Fund Prevails in Federal
Suit Against Fraud Ring, Bus. WIRE, June 25, 1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, BWIRE File (reporting
on the $2.3 million judgement awarded the SCIF in its suit against a fraudulent employee leasing enterprise
which had failed to report full payroll and had taken other steps to avoid paying workers' compensation
premiums).
56. Id.
57. Cracking Down, supra note 50.
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also perform similar work on one job while collecting workers'
compensation payments from another employer.58 Some employees may
falsely complain to doctors of an inability to do certain activities in order
to collect workers' compensation payments." Termination is often a
catalyst for fraudulent stress claims, although recent legislation which
places limitations on post-termination claims will likely reduce the number
of these bogus claims in the future.6° Perhaps the most blatant example
of a fraudulently filed claim on record is the case of a worker who claimed
to have been blinded in a work-related accident.6' After recovering
workers' compensation funds, this allegedly blind man was filmed loading
a truck with building materials, climbing behind the wheel, and driving
away.6
2
In addition to employer and employee fraud, many medical clinics also
defraud the workers' compensation system in various ways. Double billing
is commonplace, whereby two insurers (such as an employer's medical
care insurer and the employer's workers' compensation carrier) are billed
for the same care.63 Doctors often join forces with lawyers, using
58. Id.
59. See, e.g., Employee Fraud, supra note 13, at 1 (quoting Eugene Tish, chief operating officer of the
Schuler Corporation of Salem, Oregon and inferring that, when 30 disability claims appear in the first 15 minutes
of Monday morning, it is likely that most of the claims result from off-the-job injuries). The City of Pittsburgh
reported a 15% drop in workers' compensation claims in 1991 after it televised videos taken by hidden cameras
of supposedly injured police officers and firefighters working at second jobs, playing basketball and fixing roofs.
Id.
60. Stuart Silverstein, Pitching Workers' Coup; Insurance: 'Cappers' Work The Streets, Trying To Get
Passersby To Pursue Workers' Compensation Clains--Authorities Say The Practice hIcreases Fraudulent
Filings, L.A. TMms, Apr. 19, 1992, at DI [hereinafter Pitching Workers' Comp] (reporting on the practice of
workers' compensation pitchmen to try to convince unemployed people to file stress claims against their previous
employer); see Anaheim Firm, supra note 6, at 1 (noting that the incentive for insurance companies to reform
the system is low because each stress claim results in between $18,000 and $25,000 of a company's workers'
compensation insurance premium being kept by the insurance carrier as reserve for anticipated expenses); see
also CAt.. LAB. CODE § 3208.3(b) (West Supp. 1993) (requiring an employee to establish by a preponderance
of the evidence that actual events of employment were responsible for at least 10 percent of the total causation
from all sources contributing to the psychiatric injury under which compensation is being claimed); 1993 Cal.
Legis. Serv. ch. 118, sec. i, at 1040 (amending CAL. LAB. CODE § 3208.3(b) (instituting a higher threshold of
compensability for psychiatric injuries by deleting the 10 percent requirement and instead requiring the plaintiff
to show that the actual events of employment were predominant as to all combined causes of the psychiatric
injury).
61. See CURRENT PROBLEMS, supra note 3, at 15 (discussing this incident, and stating that it was
discovered during a review of closed files of the Fraud Bureau).
62. Id. After the Fraud Bureau reviewed the film, the Fraud Bureau declined to prosecute because they
found that a significant investment of time would be needed to deternine the worthiness or the prosecution. Id.;
see infra notes 125-127 and accompanying text (discussing the mediocre record of the Fraud Bureau).
63. Cracking Down, supra note 50, at I.
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solicitation systems which employ runners64  or cappers65 to promote
medical clinics by telling people outside unemployment, disability, and
welfare offices that they can receive workers' compensation benefits
regardless of whether their claim is legitimate.6 Many medical clinics
have even started using referral services to procure patients.67 Unethical
clinics are skillful at presenting inherently subjective "soft tissue" damage
diagnoses such as back injuries, which can be extremely difficult for
insurers to disprove. 68 Even when a legitimate work-related injury is
completely absent, unethical doctors will still diagnose the patient as
having such an injury. 69 The hardest types of fraud to detect include
receiving payment for medical services never rendered, ordering tests that
are not needed, and having lay people conduct tests which are billed as if
the tests were done by professionals.70 The detection of these types of
fraudulent schemes can be extremely difficult since all of the participants
are satisfied with the outcome, thereby diminishing the chances that a
64. See CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 6151(a) (West Supp. 1993) (defining runner as any person, firm,
association or corporation acting for consideration as an agent for an attorney at law or law firm in the
solicitation or procurement of business for the attorney at law or law firm).
65. See id. (defining capper in identical terms as a runner).
66. Cracking Down, supra note 50, at I; see CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 2273 (West Supp. 1993) (stating
that the practice of employing runners and cappers to procure patients constitutes unprofessional conduct);
Employee Fraud, supra note 13, at 1 (discussing the various types of workers' compensation fraud commonly
found in California, Oregon, Colorado, and New Jersey). One Los Angeles clinic, Boulevard Health Services,
offered free trips for two to Las Vegas as incentives to patients who attended 30 therapy sessions. Id.; Pitching
Workers' Comp, supra note 60, at Dl (reporting on the futility and impracticality of prosecuting individual
cappers because they play only minor roles in a sophisticated scheme of fraud). Linking the capper to a doctor
or lawyer is extremely difficult because of the complex surveillance required, and the fact that many cappers
never actually meet the doctors and lawyers for whom they work. Id.; see also California Workers'
Compensation: Twitching Millionaires, THE ECONOMIST (Oct. 3, 1992), American Survey at 29, available in
LEXIS, Nexis Library, ECON File (reporting on an investigation by the Los Angeles district-attorney's office
of several "medical-legal clinics" which chum out claims by allegedly using cappers to get people to pose as
injured or stressful workers and using stolen claims-sheets from genuine employers to back up the claims). A
set of books recently seized from such a clinic is reported to show that claims worth $100 million per year were
generated by 20 cappers. Id.
67. Sharon Bernstein, Arrests Fuel Debate Over Patient-Referral Sen'ices, L.A. TtMrts, Apr. 5, 1993, B3,
available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, LAT File. While there are stringent regulations governing this practice in
California, the line between a lawful practice and a fraudulent practice is quite hazy. Id. (quoting Michael
Dundon Roth, a Los Angeles attorney who is past chairman of the medicine and law committee of the American
Bar Association and a director of the National Health Lawyers Association); see CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §
650 (West Supp. 1993) (specifying the guidelines for compensating people for the referral of patients).
68. CONTAINING THE COSTS, supra note 2 at 79.
69. Pitching Workers' Comp, supra note 60, at DI. Recent legislation -has mandated that the Industrial
Medical Council conduct a study assessing the feasibility of requiring objective medical findings for soft tissue
injuries. See 1993 Cal. Legis. Serv. ch. 121, sec. 17, at 1065 (enacting CAL. LAB. CODE § 139.05).
70. Cracking Down, supra note 50.
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fraudulent scheme will be reported to the authorities.71 Patients are happy
because they are getting assistance in submitting a fraudulent claim,
doctors are happy because they are getting patients, and attorneys are
happy because they are getting compensated for representing these
claimants, or getting kick-backs for referrals. 7' New legislation sharply
curtails the common practice of physicians referring their patients to other
medical facilities in which the referring physician has a financial
interest,73 however the ban is full of exceptions.74 Since this legislation
did not take effect until July 16, 1993,75 its effect on the high cost of
workers' compensation is unascertainable.
Unscrupulous lawyers often combine with medical clinics in what are
known as "workers' comp mills," where runners and cappers are hired to
recruit workers outside of factories or state employment offices and refer
them to the lawyers, who assist the workers in filing claims for
compensation.76 The lawyer then sends these workers to doctors or
psychologists who perpetuate the scheme by performing costly evaluations
to justify the claims.77 A typical example is the experience of Kemper
78Insurance Company. When a Southern California plant for which
Kemper provided workers' compensation insurance laid-off 119 employees,
115 of the employees filed claims for stress and various soft tissue
injuries.79 Since the plant's closure, Kemper has received a total of 211
separate claims from the employees, and over seventy-five percent of those
claims are being handled by one law firm.80 It is likely that this is more
than mere coincidence.
71. See, e.g., Sharon Bernstein, 6 Arrested in Patient Referral Scheine, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 19, 1993, B1,
available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, LAT File (describing the arrest of five doctors and a businesswoman for
engaging in a fraudulent scheme whereby the doctors paid the businesswoman a fee for referring clients of
personal injury and workers' compensation lawyers to these doctors as patients).
72. Id.
73. See 1993 Cal. Legis. Serv. ch. 121, sec. 20, at 1069 (enacting CAL. LAB. CODE § 139.3).
74. Id., sec. 20, at 1070-72 (enacting CAL. LAB. CODE § 139.31) (setting forth numerous exceptions to
the new prohibition on referrals).
75. Id., sec. 80, at 1122 (declaring that the changes set forth in this act are needed to provide immediate
relief to California businesses and workers, and shall take effect immediately).
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Workers' Compensation System Is Ot Of Control, SAN MARINO TRIB. and SAN MARINO NEWS, July
30, 1992, in CONTAINING THE COSTS, supra note 2 at 80 (reporting on the Kemper Insurance Companies).
79. Id.
80. Id.
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Some physicians have been able to generate huge profits by simply
writing medical-legal reports8 l on claimants, regardless of the validity of
the claimant's injury. 2 Prior to recently enacted legislation,83 employers
were required to pay for these medical-legal evaluations irrespective of
whether the claim itself was ever paid, and employees whose claims were
being contested by the employer were not limited in the number of
evaluations they could obtain. 4 The employee would often procure
numerous medical-legal evaluations in order to find the most favorable
diagnosis to substantiate the claim, all at the expense of the employer.
One needs only to be reminded that the workers' compensation system was
designed to avoid costly litigation to see the absurdity of the following
scenario: (1) Lawyers representing either the claimant or the
employer/insurance company shop for a doctor willing to provide a
medical-legal evaluation favorable to their respective positions; (2) based
on the competing evaluations procured by each side, extreme postures are
taken which discourage settlement and necessitate litigation; (3) the doctors
provide expensive expert testimony at trial on the extent of the alleged
81. See CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 8, § 9793 (1986) (defining medical-legal report, for the purpose of
determining the medical-legal range of charges, as meaning all initial comprehensive medical-legal reports
submitted for the purpose of proving or disproving a contested claim); CAL. LAB. CODE § 4620 (West 1989)
(defining medical-legal expenses as any costs and expenses for X-rays, laboratory fees, other diagnostic tests,
medical reports, medical records, medical testimony, and, as needed interpreter's fees, for the purpose of proving
or disproving a contested claim). These expenses can be incurred by or on behalf of any party, the administrative
director, the board, or a referee. Id.
82. Employee Fraud, supra note 13, at I (reporting on the practice of some California physicians of
placing misleading advertisements as to what kind of injuries are compensable, then using ghostwriters to
produce the necessary medical histories for workers' compensation claims). In practice, these types of reports
are paid even if the claim is ultimately denied, thereby enabling some physicians to generate huge profits by
report writing, regardless of whether the injuries are valid. Id.; see CAL. LAB. CODE § 4624(c) (West 1989)
(establishing that charges of all physicians providing initial comprehensive industrial medical-legal reports are
rebuttably presumed reasonable, so long as the charges do not exceed the fee schedule in the Physician Fee
Index published by the California Medical Association); id. § 4625 (West 1989) (establishing that all rebuttably
presumed reasonable charges shall be paid promptly); id. § 4622(a)-(c) (West 1989) (setting forth the
requirements for prompt payment for all medical-legal expenses within 60 days after receipt by the employer
of the medical-legal report and itemized billing, and the method by which the employer may contest the
reasonableness of the expenses); id. § 4626 (West 1989) (establishing that all charges for X-rays, laboratory
services, and other diagnostic tests provided in connection with an industrial medical-legal evaluation shall be
billed according to the fee schedule adopted by the administrative director pursuant to California Labor Code
§ 5307.1).
83. See 1993 Cal. Legis. Serv. ch. 121, sec. 34, at 1081 (amending CAL. LAB. CODE § 4064); id. sec.
80, at 1122 (declaring that Chapter 121 is an urgency statute which takes effect immediately); infra notes 90-94
and accompanying text (discussing Chapter 121).
84. See 1993 Cal. Legis. Serv. ch. 121, sec. 34, at 1081 (amending CAL. LAB. CODE § 4064) (stating that
the employer is liable for the cost of each reasonable and necessary comprehensive medical-legal evaluation
obtained by the employee).
85. CONTAINING THE CoSTs, supra note 2, at 85.
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injury; and (4) the lawyers accrue expensive legal fees for litigating the
claim.86 The doctors and lawyers are essentially middlemen profiting
from the friction within the workers' compensation system, so, unlike the
insurers and employers who must pay for this expensive medical and legal
assistance, they have no incentive to avoid litigation.87 In fact, the close
correlation between the amount of medical/legal fees and the degree of
employer/employee antagonism provides significant motivation to create
and prolong the friction between employees and employers.88 The end
result of these exorbitant litigation expenses has been higher workers'
compensation insurance premiums.89
Certain sections of the California Labor Code which govern
reimbursements for medical-legal evaluations have recently undergone
significant change in order to reduce the number of medical-legal
evaluations obtained by employees. 90 First, section 4621 bars medical-
legal evaluations from being done prior to 60 days after the employer is
notified of the claim. 91 Second, section 4060 places a cap on the number
of medical-legal evaluations which the employer and employee may
obtain.92 Third, while prior law mandated only that medical-legal
expenses be necessary and reasonable, without specifying which physicians
were eligible to perform the initial medical-legal evaluation, 93 section
4060 now requires that the initial medical-legal evaluation be performed
by the treating physician.94 While it is too early to know whether these
new laws will live up to the expectations of its supporters, it appears
86. COUNCIL ON CALIFORNIA COMPETIVENESS, CALIFORNIA'S JOBS AND FUTURE (Apr. 1992) at 22,
cited in CONTAINING THE COSTS, supra note 2, at 85.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. SENATE INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS COMMITTEE, TASK FORCE ON MEDICAL-LEGAL ISSUES:
BACKGROUND PAPER, in CONTAINING THE COSTS, stipra note 2, at 85. Medical-legal evaluations account for
almost half the amount spent on litigating workers' compensation cases, costing the workers' compensation
system $700 million in 1990, while litigation cost $1.5 billion during the same period. Id. The California
Workers' Compensation Institute found that the number of reports per litigated case increased an average of 2.8
to 3.6 % between 1984 and 1990. Id. A telling indicator of the pervasive abuse in the workers' compensation
system is the fact that California's medical-legal reports often cost $1,200 and up, while in other states the
reports tend to cost from $200 to $400. Fraud Disables, supra note 3, at I (quoting Richard Victor, executive
director of the Workers' Compensation Research Institute, a nonprofit think-tank in Cambridge, Massachusetts).
90. See 1993 Cal. Legis. Serv. ch. 121, sec. 43, at 1089 (amending CAL. LAB. CODE § 4621(a)-(d)).
91. See id. (amending CAL. LAB. CODE § 4621(b)).
92. See 1993 Cal. Legis. Serv. ch. 121, sec. 29, at 1076 (enacting CAL. LAB. CODE § 4060(d)) (providing
that, in disputed claims, the employee may obtain one additional medical-legal report). The employer may only
obtain another medical-legal evaluation if the employee is represented by an attorney. Id.
93. See 1984 Cal. Stat. ch. 596, sec. 4, at 2283-85 (setting forth the requirements that reimbursable
medical-legal expenses must be both necessary and reasonable).
94. See 1993 Cal. Legis. Serv. ch. 121, sec. 29, at 1076 (enacting CAL. LAB. CODE § 4060(b)).
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certain that the California Legislature is finally serious about reducing the
amount of fraud in the workers' compensation system of this state.
Until recently, investigation and prosecution of fraud in the workers'
compensation system was actively encouraged by only a few private
insurers, or the state-run Department of Insurance.95 The most important
determination to be made by an insurer in processing a claim was whether
the claim justified payment and, if so, the amount that was due.96
Suspicious claims for a few thousand dollars were often simply paid by
insurers because it was cheaper than pursuing litigation.97 The result of
this passive practice of payment was an inordinate number of small claims
which added up to backbreaking losses for the workers' compensation
system.98
This system-wide indifference to fraud came to an abrupt halt largely
as the result of a news report broadcast on May 19, 1991 by KCBS-TV in
Los Angeles. 99 Harvey Levin, a KCBS reporter, stood outside an
unemployment office posing as an unemployed data processor and was
referred by a recruiter to the offices of lawyers and doctors who
specialized in workers' compensation cases.'O° In a client interview at a
Los Angeles law firm known as the Office of Administrative Law, Mr.
Levin told interviewers that he was not sick or injured, while videotaping
the interview by hidden video camera.'0 ' Despite his declaration of good
health, the firm filed forms describing him as suffering from severe
abdominal pain, stiff and sore neck, lower-back pain, nervousness,
dizziness, blurred vision, and too much stress on the job.10 2 He was then
95. CURRENT PROBLEMS, supra note 3, at 15; see Employee Fraud, supra note 13, at I (quoting Lor
Kammerer, managing director of Californians for Compensation Reform, as saying that when businesses
complained to their insurance companies about workers lying or inflating claims, they were often told that it
would cost more to fight such claims than to pay them). Of the 2,500 cases investigated by the State Department
of Insurance's fraud unit over its 12 year history, only 49 cases involved workers' compensation and only five
were prosecuted. Id.
96. CURRENT PROBLEMS, supra note 3, at 15.
97. Fraud Disables, supra note 3, at I (quoting Rene Thomas Folse, a workers' compensation lawyer
who represents insurers, as estimating that two sides in a dispute in California can run up $15,000 to $20,000
in medical-legal expenses just to dispense $2,000 worth of benefits to the injured worker); Employee Fraud,
supra note 15, at 1; CONTAINING THE COSTS, supra note 2, at 84.
98. Employee Fraud, supra note 13, at 1; CURRENT PROBLEMS, supra note 3, at 14-15.
99. Employee Fraud, supra note 13, at I (stating that the broadcast resulted in an increased number of
investigations into workers' compensation fraud by the State Department of Insurance and the Los Angeles
District Attorney).
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id.
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referred to a medical clinic that performed an evaluation costing
$1,195.03
New research regarding the relative costs of litigation versus out-of-
court settlements lends encouragement to the current anti-fraud climate.
While litigating fraudulent claims costs an average of $7,000, settlement
of these claims averages $17,000.14 With an average net savings of
$10,000 per claim at stake, many insurance companies are now taking a
stand against suspicious claims through a variety of methods." 5 Over the
past few years, many changes have been made to California's trouble-
ridden workers' compensation system.
B. Reforming a Fraudulent System
Until recently, methods of detecting fraudulent claims practices were
minimal, and denial of a claim often did not lead to further
investigation. 10 6 Insurance companies usually kept only the data pertinent
to processing approved claims, and information about prior claims such as
the type of claim filed, the examining doctor, or the attorney representing
the claimant was usually discarded." 7  Further, many insurance
companies feared that reporting a potentially fraudulent claim would result
in a bad faith lawsuit.'08 This passive approach to claims processing was
a serious impediment to the detection of fraud. 1°9
Those familiar with the workers' compensation system have argued
that insurers lack the incentive to reform fraud, since California's workers'
103. Id.
104. CONTAINING THE COSTS, supra note 2, at 84.
105. Id.; see infra notes 154-175 and accompanying text (discussing various techniques currently used by
workers' compensation insurers to combat suspicious claims).
106. Employee Fraud, supra note 13, at 1; see supra notes 95-98 and accompanying text (discussing the
indifference to fraud formerly exhibited by the workers' compensation system).
107. CURRENT PROBLEMS, supra note 3, at 15.
108. Id. The agency to which suspected fraud is reported is the Bureau of Fraudulent Claims of the
Department of Insurance. CAL. INS. CODE § 1872 (West Supp. 1993) (creating the Bureau of Fraudulent Claims);
id. § 1872A(a) (West Supp. 1993) (empowering the Bureau of Fraudulent Claims to review and investigate each
report as it deems necessary); see infra notes 125-153 and accompanying text (discussing the law pertinent to
the Fraud Bureau of the Department of Insurance). But see CAL. INS. CODE § 1877.5 (West 1993) (providing
civil protection to any insurer who furnishes information or assists in the investigation of acts related to workers'
compensation insurance fraud as prohibited under sections 1871.1 or 1871.4 of the California Insurance Code,
so long as it acts in good faith and reasonably believes the action taken was warranted by the facts known at
that time); Review of Selected 1991 California Legislation, 23 PAc. L.J. 704-06, 709-14 (1992) (analyzing
Chapters 116, 934, and 1222, which provide for increased scrutiny of suspicious insurance and workers'
compensation claims, heightened penalties for insurance and workers' compensation fraud, as well as relief from
civil liability for participating in the investigation of possible fraudulent claims).
109. CURRENT PROBLEMS, supra note 3, at 15.
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compensation system has guaranteed a profit to workers' compensation
insurers by allowing them to keep almost thirty-three percent of the
premium dollars collected, thus ensuring that their profit and overhead
costs would be covered."' Claims that were paid out one year simply
became the basis for higher premiums paid by employers the next
year."' Insurance companies would benefit from any increase in
premium rates, since the total pool of money from which the one-third
share of guaranteed profit comes is larger.' 12 Recent legislation has
mandated that, as of January 1, 1995, this guaranteed profit system must
be replaced by a competitive system." 3 While there is no doubt that this
will change the status quo dramatically, its consideration is largely beyond
the scope of this Comment."'
In sum, while early settlement may appear to be the most painless way
to handle a specific workers' compensation claim, the long term effect of
settling the vast majority of fraudulent claims is disastrous to California's
workers' compensation system because it simply encourages the filing of
more fraudulent claims in order to receive settlement awards, thereby
increasing premiums to employers." 5 Various remedies have been
advanced for curing California's ailing workers' compensation system, but
the proposed solutions have often reflected the interests of the group
offering the plan." 6 Insurers ask for limits on the practices of
unscrupulous attorneys and physicians who work together to recruit more
claims, as well as for more stringent review of claims. 1 7 Conversely,
attorneys who represent injured workers argue for more participation in the
110. CONTAINING THE COSTS, supra note 2, at 13, 82 (observing that claims paid out by insurance
companies become the basis for higher premium rates the next year); see supra notes 38-44 and accompanying
text (discussing the procedure for setting the minimum premium rates which may be charged by workers'
compensation insurers).
111. CONTAINING THE COSTS, supra note 2, at 82. But see Mary Lynn Vellinga, Garamendi Says 'No'
to 12.6% Hike, SACRAMENTO BEE, Dec. 1, 1992 (denying the latest workers' compensation insurers' latest
request for a rate hike because the request was based on wildly inconsistent expense ratios).
112. CONTAINING THE COSTS, supra note 2, at 82.
113. 1993 Cal. Legis. Serv. ch. 228, sec 2, at 1482 (enacting CAL. INS. CODE § 11735(a)).
114. See infra note 369 and accompanying text (positing the theory that this new competitive system
increases the incentive for workers' compensation insurers to arbitrarily withhold payment of all but the most
routine claims as a method of increasing profits while lowering insurance rates charged employers).
115. See E. Scott Reckard, A New Policy For Insurance Fraud; The Search Is On To Catch The Fakes,
THE WASH. TIMES, Apr. 19, 1992, at AI5, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, WTIMES ile (quoting Allen
D. Field, head of major fraud prosecutions in Los Angeles County as saying that insurance companies are now
realizing that the current practice of not contesting a $10,000 fraudulent claim encourages five more fraudulent
claims for the same thing),
116. Bradley J. Pikes, Workers' Comp Update; Costs, Rform and Garamendi, SAN DII'GO BUS. J., Mar.
9, 1992, § 1, at 13, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, SDBJ File.
117. Id.
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system, complaining that California's expensive workers' compensation
system is being made a scapegoat for other economic problems, such as
high unemployment, which are more appropriately attributed to the
ongoing recession." 8 Virtually every interest group admits that the
workers' compensation system must be altered in order to reduce the high
degree of fraud currently within the system." 9 Yet any proposed
legislation which threatens the interests of the various participants in the
workers' compensation system is usually diluted by sophisticated lobbyists
representing these well-financed special interest groups.120 Despite these
special interests, legislation which took effect on January 1, 199212 is
having a positive effect on the number of reports of fraud.12 1 Since
investigation and prosecution of these reports of fraudulent practices is
painstakingly slow, the question of whether the 1991 anti-fraud laws will
translate into actual cost savings to the workers' compensation system
through a reduction in incidents of fraud is likely to remain unanswered
for several years. 2 3 Further, recent legislation which took effect on July
16, 1993, adds additional bite to the current anti-fraud climate. 2 4
118. Id.
119. Fraud Disables, supra note 3, at 1.
120. Id. (quoting Casey L. Young, administrative director of the California Division of Workers'
Compensation, discussing the practice of various interest groups of hiring very effective lobbyists who fight
reform legislation so that its usefulness is compromised); see, e.g., WORKERS' COMPENSATION PRACTICE: USING
THE NEW SYSTEM, 67 (Cal. Continuing Educ. Bar Sept./Oct. 1991) [hereinafter New System] (noting that heavy
insurance industry lobbying was responsible for the defeat of Assembly Bill 1560 (Margolin) which would have
increased the life of the Workers' Compensation Rate Study Commission, whose goal was to present a report
on ways to reduce costs of the workers' compensation system); id. at 68 (reporting that the attorneys' lobby was
able to achieve a last minute addition to the statute of amendments to CAL. LAB. CODE §§ 4903(a), 5710(b)(4),
which mandated that only licensed attorneys were entitled to legal fees earned from representing clients, and
predicting that hearing representatives will likely be proposing new legislation to undo these last minute
changes); supra notes 110-112 and accompanying text (discussing the absence of incentive to reduce costs of
the workers' compensation system). But see New System, supra, at 67 (noting that employer interests tried
unsuccessfully to make the following changes to recent legislation changing CAL. LAB. CODE § 3208.3: (1) The
requirement of clear and convincing evidence to establish a stress claim; (2) limiting recovery to stress following
a sudden and extraordinary event; (3) exclusion of recovery for stress following routine personnel actions; and
(4) substitution of 50% or 30% for the present requirement that 10% of the total causation from all sources
which were responsible for the stress injury of a claimant were derived from events of employment).
121. See 1991 Cal. Slat. cbs. 934, 116, 1222 (enacting and amending various sections of the CAL. INS.
CODE and the CAL. LABOR CODE).
122. Insurers Come on Strong in Probing Worker Comp Cases, L.A. Bus. I., Aug. 31, 1992, at 1,
available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, LABJ File [hereinafter Probing Worker Comp].
123. Id.
124. See infra notes 154-163 and accompanying text (discussing the recent changes to the California
Business and Professions Code).
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1. The 1991 Anti-Fraud Legislation
Prior to the enactment of the 1991 anti-fraud laws,"z very little was
being done to deter fraud in the workers' compensation system.
2 6
Although the Bureau of Fraudulent Claims had been created for the
purpose of reviewing and investigating fraudulent insurance claims, 12 7
only 160 suspected cases of fraud were reported to the Fraud Bureau
between 1979 and 1986.128 By 1988, just seventeen of those cases had
been investigated, and only one had been prosecuted.2 9 Widespread
awareness of the significant deleterious effects of fraud on California's
workers' compensation system led to new legislation. 30 The 1991 anti-
fraud laws take a two-pronged attack aimed at reducing fraudulent claims
by requiring mandatory investigation units to ferret out violators and
imposing stiffer criminal penalties for punishing the guilty culprits. 131
Investigation of false claims is enhanced by the 1991 laws requiring
insurers to maintain a special investigative unit whose purpose is to detect
possible fraudulent claims. 3 2 Also, insurers are now required to give
various authorized government agencies 33 all relevant information that
they possess regarding an investigation of possible workers' compensation
125. See 1991 Cal. Slat. chs. 934, 116, 1222 (providing stiffer penalties for those convicted of defrauding
the workers' compensation system, and requiring all insurers to maintain a unit to investigate possible fraudulent
claims).
126. CONTAINING THE COSTS, supra note 2, at 82.
127. See CAL. INS. CODE § 1872 (West 1993) (creating the Bureau of Fraudulent Claims); § 1872.4(a)
(West 1993) (empowering the Bureau of Fraudulent Claims to review and investigate each report as it deems
necessary).
128. CONTAINING THE COSTS, supra note 2, at 82.
129. CURRENT PROBLEMS, supra note 3, at 14.
130. See supra notes 99-103 and accompanying text (providing an example of the growing public
awareness of fraud which has led to the enactment of Chapters 934, 116 and 1222).
131. See infra notes 132-146 and accompanying text (discussing the laws which require the formation of
investigative units by insurers, and provide for more severe penalties for fraud and misrepresentation in the
workers' compensation system; New Syslem, supra note 120, at 68 (noting that provisions to discourage
overreaching by attorneys, doctors, and others were already in effect prior to the new legislation, btt that, in
some instances, what had fomierly been accepted as normal competitive business practices to obtain clients or
to achieve an adequate award for a client may now be grounds for investigation and prosecution).
132. CAL. INS. CODE § 1875.20 (West 1993). All insurers were required to establish the investigative unit
by July 1, 1992. Id. § 1875.22 (West Supp. 1992); see Kathy M. Kristof, Workers' Col Reform Unveiled By
Garamendi, L.A. TIMFS, Jan. 25, 1992, § D at I. available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, LAT File (quoting
Insurance Commissioner John Garamendi as saying that the new law is designed to target doctors, attorneys,
and medical care workers who encourage the filing of fraudulent workers' compensation claims).
133. See CAL. INS. CODE § 1877.1(a) (West 1993) (defining authorized governmental agency as the district
attorney of any county, the office of the Attorney General, the Department of Insurance, ihe Department of
Industrial Relations, and any licensing agency governed by the Business and Professions Code).
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insurance fraud.'34 Employers are assessed a fee to pay for the
investigation and prosecution of violators.135 This augmented program for
rooting out violators of the workers' compensation system is accompanied
by heightened penalties for those convicted of defrauding the workers'
compensation system.'36
Criminal penalties for defrauding the workers' compensation system
have been increased in an effort to discourage fraudulent and abusive
practices.'37 The act of intentionally misrepresenting a fact for the
purpose of obtaining workers' compensation insurance at an improperly
low rate was formerly a misdemeanor, however section 11760 of the
California Insurance Code now allows for a felony conviction for this type
of misrepresentation, providing for up to five years imprisonment or a fine
of up to $50,000, or double the value of the fraud, whichever is
greater. 38 Advertisements which pertain to industrial injuries or illnesses
that are false or misleading with respect to workers' compensation are now
prohibited. 139  While cappers and runners who procure claimants for
134. See id. § 1877.3(a)-(b) (West 1993) (mandating that the governmental agency provide the insurer with
a written request for the desired information, and absent such a request, imposing the duty on insurers to notify
the Bureau of Fraudulent Claims of the Department of Insurance if they have any knowledge or reasonable belief
that a fraudulent act has been committed). Any information given to an authorized governmental agency must
be kept confidential by that agency, may only be confidentially released to other authorized governmental
agencies for the purposes of investigation, prosecution, or prevention of insurance fraud, and may not be made
part of the public record. Id. §§ 1877.3(c), 1877.4(a) (West 1993); see also id. § 1877.1(b) (West 1993) (defining
relevant as having a tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the investigation or
determination of an issue more probable or less probable than it would be without the information).
135. See CAL LAR. CODE § 62.6 (West Supp. 1993) (authorizing the establishment of the State Fraud
Investigation and Prosecution Surcharge, from which revenues are deposited in the Workers' Compensation
Fraud Account in the Insurance Fund to be used for the investigation and prosecution of workers' compensation
fraud as prescribed by California Insurance Code § 1872.83); CAL. INS. CODE §§ 1877-1877.5 (West 1993)
(creating the Workers' Compensation Insurance Fraud Reporting Act and establishing criteria by which insurers
are required to report'workers' compensation insurance fraud). The justification for this mandatory assessment
is the explicit legislative finding that workers' compensation fraud contributes to the increasing costs of workers'
compensation, and that prevention of this fraud may reduce the number of workers' compensation claims and
payments, ultimately reducing the costs of the entire system. Id. § 1871(d)-(f) (West 1993): see also Review of
Selected 1991 Califonia Legislation, 23 PAc. L.J. 709, 712 (1992) (contrasting pre-1992 law with the current
law relating to the handling of fraudulent workers' compensation claims brought about by the enactment of the
Workers' Compensation Insurance Fraud Reporting Act); itfra notes 145-153 and accompanying text (discussing
Chapters 116, 934, and 1222, and their effectiveness in reducing workers' compensation fraud).
136. See CAL. INS. CODE §§ 11760(a), 11880(a) (West Supp. 1993); infra notes 135-140 and
accompanying text.
137. See Review of Selected 1991 Califonia Legislation, 23 PAC. L.J. 704-06, 709-14 (1992) (reviewing
the changes brought about by 1991 California Statute Chapters 116, 934, and 1222).
138. CAl.. INS. CODE §§ 11760(a), 11880(a) (West Supp. 1993). A person who violates sections 11760(a)
or 11880(a), and has a prior felony conviction under the same subdivision is subject to a two-year enhanced
sentence for each prior conviction. Id. §§ 11760(b), 11880(b). Extreme violations can result in both
imprisonment and a fine. Id. § 11760(a) (West Supp. 1993).
139. CAL. LAB. CODE § 139.45 (West Supp. 1993).
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doctors or attorneys, as well as those employing them, are only subject to
misdemeanor penalties, 140  the stakes escalate dramatically with a
subsequent conviction.' Repeat offenses are felonies, and can be
punished by up to three years in prison as well as a fine of up to
$10,000.142
Section 1871.4 of the California Insurance Code imposes severe
penalties for making false or fraudulent written or oral statements to either
obtain or deny compensation. 143 However, section 1871.4 acts as a
double-edged sword because it applies to both sides of the system: to those
who make fraudulent statements for the purpose of obtaining compensation
from insurers,'" and to employers and insurers who make fraudulent
statements in an effort to deny compensation to claimants. 45 While these
heightened criminal penalties, along with the new mandatory reporting of
suspicious claims, indicate a significant alteration in California's approach
to workers' compensation fraud, the initial effectiveness of these penalties
in reducing the amount of fraud in the workers' compensation system has
been questionable. 14
6
Although it is still somewhat premature to judge the long-term
effectiveness of the 1991 anti-fraud laws because of their relative newness,
140. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 2315(a) (West Supp. 1993) (setting forth the punishment for those found
guilty of employing persons to procure patients); id. § 6152(a)(1)-(2) (West 1990) (making it unlawful for a
person to either work as a runner or capper, or to solicit others to work as a runner or capper); id. § 6153 (West
Supp. 1993) (providing the penalty for conviction under California Business and Professions Code § 6152).
141. See infra note 142 and accompanying text.
142. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 2315(b) (West Supp. 1993) (providing for a maximtum penalty of 3 years
in prison and a $10,000 fine upon a second or subsequent conviction of employment of nnners and cappers,
in violation of California Business and Professions Code § 2273); id. § 6153 (West Supp. 1993) (providing the
same penalty for conviction of working as a runner or capper, in violation of Califoria Business and Professions
Code § 6152).
143. CAL. INS. CODE § 1871.4(a)-(c) (West Supp. 1993). Violators of this section can be imprisoned for
up to five years, and be fined up to $50,000, or double the value of the fraud, whichever is greater. Id. §
1871.4(b) (West Supp. 1993).
144. Examples of such claimants are patients, medical clinics, and attorneys.
145. CAL. INS. CODE § 1871.4(a)(4) (West 1992). Violations are punishable by imprisonment in county
jail for one year, or in state prison for up to five years. Id. § 1871.4(b) (West 1992). In lieu of a prison sentence,
a fine may be imposed for up to $50,000 or double the value of the fraud, whichever is greater. Id. Extreme
violations can result in both imprisonment and fine. Id. Any person who has a prior felony conviction under
California Insurance Code § 1871.4(a), or of former § 1871.1 of the California Insurance Code, or of sections
548 or 550 of the California Penal Code, will receive a two year enhancement for each prior conviction. Id. §
1871.4(c) (West 1992); see infra notes 370-373 and accompanying text (suggesting that the Legislature enact
a statutory treble damages penalty which is imposed on insurance companies who fraudulently withhold payment
of claims).
146. See Hallye Jordan, Funds Sought to Fight Comp Fraud, Los ANGELES DAILY J., June 17, 1992, at
3 [hereinafter Funds Sought]; infra notes 145-153 and accompanying text (discussing the marginal effectiveness
of the 1991 anti-fraud laws).
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one trend has become evident: The number of reported instances of
suspected fraud has increased dramatically.1 47 The dismal number of
reported instances of fraud prior to 1992148 was eclipsed within the first
three months of 1992, when 977 cases of suspected fraud were
reported. 49 This number grew to almost 4,000 reported instances of
suspected fraud by mid-year.150 Critics of the new anti-fraud program
were not impressed by this rise in the number of reports of suspected
fraud, and complained that these reports did not translate into an actual
reduction in the amount of fraud plaguing the workers' compensation
system.'5 ' In fact, state investigators and local prosecutors claimed that
the new program was almost totally ineffective.152 Even the State
Insurance Commissioner has admitted that fraud has only been reduced by
two percent since the new anti-fraud laws went into effect. 53 Perhaps the
biggest obstacle facing the new anti-fraud program has been insufficient
funding. 54 The tremendous number of fraud reports received by the
Fraud Bureau averaged 100 calls per day by mid-1992, creating a tidal
wave of paperwork which virtually swamped investigators and hampered
their effectiveness.' 55 New legislation has expanded the sources of
available funds with which to prosecute those who are abusing the
workers' compensation system.
2. Using Dirty Money to Clean Up the Workers' Compensation
System
Legislation which took effect on July 16, 1993 attempts to address
prosecutors' complaints of insufficient funding to fight fraud within the
workers' compensation system. 5 6 Section 6154 of the California
147. CONTAINING THE COSTS, supra note 2, at 83-84.
148. Only 160 suspected cases of fraud were reported between 1979 and 1986. CONTAINING THE COSTS,
supra note 2, at 82.
149. Funds Sought, supra note 146, at 1.
150. Id.
151. Funds Sought, supra note 146, at 1.
152. See id. (stating that common complaints of investigators and prosecutors are that the system was
poorly conceived and badly underfunded).
153. CONTAINING THE COSTS, supra note 2, at 83.
154. See id. at 84 (reporting that the program's original $3,000,000 appropriation was insufficient and
needed an additional $10,000,000). The legislature responded by adding an additional $7,000,000 to the program.
Id.
155. Id.
156. See supra note 152 and accompanying text (noting the lack of financial resources available to
prosecutors).
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Business and Professions Code expands the sources of funds available to
district attorneys' offices.'57 The income of an attorney which was earned
through the use of runners or cappers can now be seized and used by the
prosecuting district attorney to investigate and prosecute fraud.'58
Further, section 6154 expressly voids any contracts for professional
services which were obtained under fraudulent circumstances, provides for
the recovery of any fees collected under such a contract, and mandates that
these fees go to the prosecuting district attorney's office. 5 9 It is still too
early to tell whether these changes will yield funds sufficient to bring the
number of prosecutions to a level which corresponds with the number of
reports of fraud.
California now allows any interested party to bring a civil action, in the
name of the State, for the crime of employing runners or cappers to
procure workers' compensation applicants.'6t The Attorney General or
district attorney can intervene in this type of action, and take responsibility
for prosecution of the suit.' 6' Because the action is brought in the name
of the state, it can only be dismissed if the court and the Attorney General
acquiesce in the dismissal. 162 While this ability to bring a civil suit for
employing runners or cappers will assist in reducing this fraudulent
practice, its narrowness does not address the entire spectrum of means by
which fraud impacts the workers' compensation system. 163  Many
insurance companies have been resorting to various methods of combatting
the types of fraud which are not addressed by these recent changes in thelaw. t64
157. 1993 Cal. Legis. Serv. ch. 120, sec. 2, at 1046 (enacting CAL BUS. & PROF. CODE § 6154(b))
(providing that one-half of any penalty collected by a district attorney for the unlawful employment of a runner
or capper is paid to the county treasurer of the county in which the judgment was entered, and one-half of the
penalty is paid to the Workers' Compensation Fraud Account in the Insurance Fund).
158. Id.
159. See id. (enacting CAL. BuS. & PROF. CODE § 6154(a)).
160. See Cal. Legis. Serv. ch. 120, sec. 3.2, at 1048 (enacting CAL. INS. CODE § 1871.7(d)-(e)).
161. See id., sec. 3.3, at 1048 (enacting CAL. INS. CODE § 1871.7(e)(2)).
162. See id. (enacting § 1871.7(e)(1)). If the Attorney General or the district attorney choose to intervene
in the action, they may elect to dismiss the suit notwithstanding the objections of the person initiating the action.
See id. (enacting § 1871.7(f)(2)(A)).
163. See supra notes 50-89 and accompanying text (discussing the various types of fraud, other than
employing runners, cappers, and steerers, employed by medical clinics and attorneys).
164. See infra notes 165-173 and accompanying text.
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C. A New Trend in Fighting Workers' Compensation Fraud
Several major insurance companies have assumed aggressive stances
towards workers' compensation fraud, adopting various tactics to defeat the
large number of fraudulent claims submitted by so called workers'
compensation mills. 65 For instance, Transamerica Insurance Group's
special fraud investigation unit has been saving the company
approximately $1 million per month by identifying suspicious claims and
simply refusing to pay them. 66  Such a refusal to pay forces the
fraudulent mills into the public eye by filing suit, or appealing to the State
Workers' Compensation Appeals Board.' 67 The Kemper Insurance
Company has begun subpoenaing records from suspected fraudulent
medical clinics. 168 In one case alone, this tactic forced a medical clinic
to dismiss $56,000 in suspicious medical liens. 69
A novel anti-fraud tactic with potentially far-reaching implications has
been adopted by Zenith Insurance Company ("Zenith"): Use of the
Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organization Act (RICO). 70 This
tactic circumvents the prohibitive cost of litigating each suspicious claim
in a separate action. 171 Instead, Zenith was able to consolidate all of the
claims submitted by a suspected workers' compensation mill into one civil
165. See, e.g., Fremont Comp Launches Aggressive Anti-Fraud Campaign, BUS. WIRE, Jan. 21, 1992,
available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, BWIRE File (discussing Fremont Compensation Insurance Company's
aggressive anti-fraud campaign based on deterrence and support of aggressive prosecution); Fremnont Anti-Fraud
Campaign Leads To First Criminal Indictments, Bus. WIRE, Apr. 22, 1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library,
BWIRE File (reporting on an indictment of a medical clinic and workers' compensation claimant for insurance
fraud under the new anti-fraud legislation). Fremont Comp has reported dozens of cases for review to several
district attorneys and has been working intimately with the State Bureau of Fraudulent Claims as well as district
attorneys' offices in investigating fraud. Id.; see also Garamendi Announces Insurance Fraud Bust; Key Suspect
In Major Workers Compensation Fraud Case Arrested, Bus. WIRE, Apr. 19, 1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis
Library, BWIRE File (reporting on the indictment of Jorge Coronado, owner of a business called Spanish
Marketing, which is estimated to have cost California businesses over $100 million in just 18 months through
the processing of fraudulent workers compensation insurance claims). Coronado's arrest was the result of an
investigation that produced nine arrests in April under the new anti-fraud laws. Briefly: hIsurance, L.A. TIMES,
Aug. 20, 1992, at D2, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, LAT File.
166. Probing Worker Comp, supra note 122, at 1 (reporting that Transamerica found that 10 medical
clinics using 120 different names had accounted for 40 percent of the company's total gross workers' comp
billings in 1991).
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1868.
171. See supra notes 104-105 and accompanying text (noting that the litigation of fraudulent claims costs
an average of $7,000).
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RICO action.' In late 1991, Zenith filed a civil RICO suit in United
States District Court, Central District of California17 3 against Wellington
Medical Corporation and other medical care providers, attorneys, and
workers' compensation claimants ("Wellington")." Wellington
subsequently filed a countersuit against Zenith and other insurance
companies alleging antitrust violations." 5 These suits were ultimately
settled out-of-court, with Wellington agreeing to dismiss the antitrust suit,
and to drop more than $1.6 million in workers' compensation claims.17 6
While these suits were still pending, Zenith brought several more civil
RICO suits against other workers' compensation mills. 7  This method
of consolidating fraudulent claims into one civil RICO suit has proven to
be a cost-effective means for insurers to fight fraud in the workers'
compensation system." 8 Nevertheless, this powerful weapon which tips
the balance of power in favor of the insurance companies may be
172. See infra notes 245-254 and accompanying text (discussing the concept of a pattern of racketeering
activity, which is an essential element of a civil RICO suit).
173. In order to bring a RICO suit, Zenith had to sue in federal court because California's state law
equivalent of federal RICO, known as a "little RICO" statute, does not provide for a private cause of action.
CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 186-186.7 (West 1988 & Supp, 1993); see infra notes 368-371 and accompanying text
(suggesting that California enact a "little RICO" statute that provides for a private cause of action).
174. Zenith Complaint, supra note 19, at 7-29 (alleging that various medical care providers have engaged
in RICO violations through fraudulent and/or excessive billing practices). In the interest of clarity, the defendants
in the Zenith suit will be referred to collectively as "Wellington," however the full list of defendants is as
follows: American Psychometric Consultants, Inc.; Robert S. Ransom, David Leonelli; Wellington Medical
Corporation, Timothy Fishback; Hoseyn Safai; Glen A. Lintner (individual); Glen A. Lintner (law firm); Yolanda
N. Arriola; A&W Interpreting Services; Jesus Ayala; Bulmaro Cabrera; Jose Cabrera; Manuel Cabrera; and
Santos Cabrera. Id., at i.
175. See Princeton Complaint, supra note 20, at 7-12 (alleging illegal agreements between various
insurance companies and employers to avoid paying workers' compensation obligations). In the interest of
clarity, the plaintiffs in the Princeton v Zenith antitrust suit will be referred to collectively as "Wellington,"
which is also the referenced defendant in the Zenith Insurance Company v. American Psychometric Consultants,
Inc. suit. The complete list of plaintiffs is as follows: Princeton Medical Corporation; Wellington Medical
Corporation; American Assessment Medical Corporation; California Comp Care Medical Corporation; and
Professional Consultation Services, Inc. Id., at 1. See also 15 U.S.C.S. § 1 (1985 & Supp. 1993) (§ I of the
Sherman Act); 15 U.S.C.S. § 15 (1985) (§ 4 of the Clayton Act); 15 U.S.C.S. § 26 (1991) (§ 16 of the Clayton
Act) (setting forth the various antitrust laws which Zenith is alleged to have violated).
176. See infra notes 352-360 and accompanying text (discussing the settlement terms of the Zenith suit).
177. See Zenith Insurance Files Its Fourth RICO Action Against Alleged Abusers of The Workers'
Compensation System, Bus. WIRE, Oct. 20, 1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, BWIRE File.
178. The use of civil RICO has also been used to effectively fight employer fraud within the workers'
compensation system. Last year, the State Compensation Insurance Fund won a civil RICO suit against a
fraudulent employee leasing company who had misrepresented the ownership of several businesses and failed
to report full payroll in an effort to avoid paying their fair share of workers' compensation premiums. See RICO
Suit Judgement in Workers' Comp Fraud Case; State Fund Prevails in Federal Suit Against Fraud Ring, Bus,
WIRE, June 25, 1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, BWIRE File.
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introducing new dangers into the workers' compensation system.' 9 A
close look at the policies behind RICO and related antitrust laws reveals
vast differences in their application to California's workers' compensation
system.
H. THE CONFLICTING POLICIES OF CIVIL RICO AND
ANTITRUST LAWS
The Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act 180  is
relatively new, and has been constantly expanding since its inception in
1970.181 A summary of RICO's background shows that the use of RICO
in fighting workers', compensation fraud is a logical and significant
expansion of this civil cause of action.'82 Conversely, antitrust law has
borne an extensive body of case law, extending back more than five
centuries.' 83 An examination of the background of these two civil causes
of action highlights the effectiveness of the civil RICO suit in combatting
workers' compensation mills, and underscores the relative difficulty that
a medical care provider would have in attempting to prove violations of
antitrust laws by workers' compensation insurance companies.
8 4
179. See infra notes 365-366 and accompanying text (discussing the relatively minimal risk of liability to
treble damage suits which workers' compensation insurers enjoy in relation to medical care providers).
180. 18 U.S.C.S. §§ 1961-68 (1991 & Supp. 1993).
181. GREGORY P. JOSEPH, CIVIL RICO: A DEFINMVE GUIDE at 3 (1992).
182. See infra notes 185-256 and accompanying text (providing a very brief summary of the RICO Act).
183. Dyer's Case, Y.B. Pasch. 2 Hen. V, f. 5, pl. 5 (1414) (voiding an agreement between a master and
his indentured servant, in which the servant, upon completing his term of apprenticeship, has promised not to
use his art for half a year).
184. See infra notes 257-304 and accompanying text (discussing the complexities of proving antitrust
violations by an insurer). A medical care provider seeking treble damages against an insurer who is defrauding
the workers' compensation system would be relegated to an antitrust claim, since, under California law, insurers
are exempt from liability for violations of the federal RICO statute. American International Group, Inc. v.
Superior Court, 234 Cal. App. 3d 749, 767, 285 Cal. Rptr. 765, 776 (1991). See infra notes 207-215 and
accompanying text (discussing the American Int'L Group, Inc. v. Superior Court decision, finding that extensive
state regulations of the insurance industry precluded liability under federal RICO laws).
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A. The Expansive Policy of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt
Organizations Act
The Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) 8 5
was included within the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970
(OCCA). 8 6 The OCCA was part of the government's war against the
infiltration of organized crime into America's legitimate business
community.'87 Therefore, the original RICO bill before the United States
Senate was based primarily on criminal law, limiting civil remedies to
injunctive actions brought by the federal government. 8 The RICO
statute's statement of findings expressly called for broad and liberal
interpretation of RICO in order to more effectively fight the serious threat
posed by organized crime.189 Shortly before the House of Representatives
approved the RICO bill, they added a treble damages remedy patterned
after Section Four of the Clayton Act,'90 an antitrust statute.' 91 This
treble damages remedy was intended to be a civil remedy for those who
185. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-68 (1991 & Supp. 1993). RICO was enacted as Title IX of the Organized Crime
Control Act of 1970. Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 922, 941 (1970). See generally JOSEPH, supra note 181
(providing a comprehensive guide to civil actions under RICO, and reporting on opinions of the United States
Supreme Court and federal courts of appeals dealing with civil RICO litigation); DOUGLAS 13. ABRAMS, THIE
LAW Or CIVIL RICO (1991 & 1992 Supp.) [hereinafter ABRAMS]; Douglas E. Abrams, Civil RICO's Cause of
Action: The Landscape After Sedima, 12 TUL. MAP. L.J. 19 (1987) [hereinafter Landscape]; Douglas E. Abrams,
The Place of Procedural Control in Detennining Who May Sue or Be Sued: Lessons in Stattuton
' 
hIterpretation
from Civil RICO and Sedima, 38 VAND. L. REv. 1477 (1985); PAUL A. BATISTA & MARK S. RHODES, CIVIL
RICO PRACTICE MANUAL: 1992 CUMULATIVE SUPPLEMENT NO. 2 (1992)).
186. Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, § 904, 84 Stat. 922 (codified as amended
in §§ 18, 28 U.S.C. (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
187. JOSEPH, supra note 181, at 2-3; Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat. at 943 (1970).
188. Id. at 2-3.
189. Pub. L. No. 91-452, § 904, 84 Stat. 947 (1970); see JOSEPH, supra note 181, at 3 (citing various cases
which differ in their interpretation as to how far to expand the limits of civil litigation under RICO); 1970 U.S.
Code Cong. & Admin. News 1073 (setting forth in the statement of findings that the purpose of RICO is to
eradicate organized crime). See generally Note, RICO and the Liberal Construtclion Clause, 66 CORNELL L. REV,
167 (1980).
190. 15 U.S.C.S. § 15 (1985) (codifying § 4 of the Clayton Act, which provides the remedy of treble
damages, the cost of the suit, and reasonable attorney's fees to any person who has been injured in his business
or property by any action forbidden in the antitrust laws).
191. JOSEPH, supra note 181, at 2-3; see 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (stating that any person injured in his
business or property by reason of a violation of section 1962 of this chapter may sue therefor in any appropriate
United States district court and shall recover threefold the damages he sustains and the cost of the suit, including
a reasonable attorney's fee); H.R. 1549, 91st Cong., 2d Sess., 116 Cong. Rec. 35,363-64 (1970) (amending the
bill to include a treble damages remedy similar to section 4 of the Clayton Act); 116 Cong. Rec. 36,296 (1970)
(approving the amendment adding a treble damages remedy).
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had been injured by reason of criminal activity prohibited by the bill. a"'
Because of the legislative intent underlying the inclusion of the civil RICO
remedy, early court decisions of civil RICO suits required a criminal
conviction under RICO as a prerequisite for bringing a civil suit. Such a
requirement is no longer the case. 193  Despite the statute's explicit
mandate for broad interpretation of RICO, some scholars have theorized
that the lateness of this addition of a civil remedy to the RICO Act
precluded Congress from fully contemplating the extent to which the
plaintiff pool would be expanded.' 94 Nevertheless, the reach of civil
RICO is continually expanding, and has been used against such diverse
defendants as Big Eight accounting firms,19 banks,196 colleges,197
insurance companies, 98  law firms, 19 and securities investment
firms,2' as well as controversial organizations such as the Church of
Scientology"' and the Ku Klux Klan.2 2
192. JOSEPH, supra note 181, at 2-3; Sweeney, An Introduction To RICO, 12 TtUL. MAR. L.J. 7, 9-10
(1987) (noting that civil RICO was intended to help reform corrupt organizations, and the civil remedy was
meant to be used after successful criminal prosecution). In 1977, the United States Supreme Court held that
plaintiffs must prove injury of the type the antitrust laws were designed to prevent in order to have civil RICO
standing. Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 489 (1977). While more recent decisions
have not adhered to this narrow view, RICO's resemblance to the Clayton Act still prompts many courts to
consider antitrust caselaw under the Clayton Act in deciding RICO lawsuits. See Agency Holding Corp. v.
Malley-Duff & Assoc., Inc., 483 U.S. 143, 156 (1987); Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S.
220, 241 (1987) (relying on the Clayton Act for guidance in interpreting the RICO statute).
193. Sedima v. Imrex, 473 U.S. 479, 491 (1985) (noting that the burden of proof necessary for criminal
conviction is proof beyond a reasonable doubt, while the lesser preponderance standard is all that is needed for
civil sanctions). There is no evidence that Congress intended to impose a higher burden of proof on civil RICO
actions, therefore, absence of a criminal conviction does not preclude a civil cause of action under the less
onerous burden of proof. Id. at 491; see Sweeney, supra note 192, at 9-10 (noting that civil RICO was intended
to help reform corrupt organizations, and the civil remedy was meant to be used only after successful criminal
prosecution).
194. JOSEPH, supra note 181, at 3. This lack of opportunity for complete forethought is the most likely
explanation for the dramatic and unexpected variety of civil RICO defendants who are not typically associated
with professional criminals. Id.; Landscape, supra note 185, at 22-23; see Abrams, supra note 185, at 25-37
(discussing the legislative history of Civil RICO). Note that many states have enacted "little RICO" statutes
patterned on federal RICO. See RICO CASES COMMITrEE, A COMPREHENSIVE PERSPECTIVE ON CIVIL AND
CRIMINAL RICO LEGISlATiON AND LmGATION App. C (ABA Crim. Just. Syst., Apr. 18, 1985) (providing the
text of the Federal RICO statute and comparing it with the following state RICO statutes: Arizona, California,
Colorado, Connecticut, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Nevada, New Jersey, New Mexico,
North Dakota, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Utah and Wisconsin). Unlike most states, California has no
private cause of action. CAl.. PEN. CODE § 186-186.7 (West 1988 & Supp. 1993).
195. See, e.g., Bank of Am. Nat'l Trust & Says. Ass'n v. Touche Ross & Co., 782 F.2d 966 (1 1th Cir.
1986).
196. See, e.g., Wilcox v. First Interstate Bank, 815 F.2d 522 (9th Cir. 1987).
197. See, e.g., Robinson v. City Colleges of Chicago, 656 F. Supp. 555 (N.D. 11. 1987).
198. See, e.g., Agency Holding Corp. v. Malley-Duff & Assocs., 107 S. Ct. 2759 (1987).
199. See, e.g., Penturelli v. Spector, Cohen, Gadon & Rosen, 640 F. Supp 868 (E.D. Pa. 1986).
200. See, e.g., Shearson/Am. Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 107 S. Ct. 2332 (1987).
201. See, e.g., Van Schaick v. Church of Scientology, Inc., 535 F. Supp. 1125 (D. Mass. 1982).
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The criminal law origin of the civil RICO cause of action has induced
a judicial reluctance to limit the types of conduct giving rise to civil RICO
actions due to concern that any limitation on RICO for civil actions might
create a similar limiting precedent for criminal RICO prosecutions of
organized crime.0 3 Such a limiting precedent could compromise RICO's
ability to do the very job for which it was intended.2" The result has
been a judicial trend of giving very wide berth to civil RICO actions
devoid of organized crime implications.0 5 Contrary to the expansive
trend of civil RICO, a recent California Court of Appeal decision places
a limitation on the civil RICO cause of action which directly impacts
California's workers' compensation system.20 6
In 1991, the California Court of Appeal for the Second District
affirmed a lower court decision that federal antitrust laws precluded
insurance companies from being sued under the federal RICO Act.20 7 In
American International Group, Inc. v. Superior Court,0 8 it was alleged
that a defendant insurer, American International Group, violated the RICO
Act by perpetrating a fraudulent scheme to avoid paying premium refunds
to its clients.2' The appellate court held that, under the McCarran-
Ferguson Act,210 the insurance industry is to be regulated primarily by
the states, and not the federal government.21 I Because California already
202. See, e.g., Vietnamese Fishermen's Ass'n v. Knights of the Ku Klux Klan, 543 F. Supp. 198 (S.D.
Tex. 1982); see generally Landscape, supra note 185, at 22-23 (discussing the expansion of civil RICO litigation
to maritime actions and citing additional examples of civil RICO suits against a variety of defendants not
normally associated with organized crime).
203. JOSEPH, supra note 181, at 3-4.
204. Id.
205. See Landscape, supra note 185, at 22-23 (noting that, as of 1985, only nine percent of the 270 district
court civil RICO decisions involved allegations of criminal activity of a type generally associated with
professional criminals). Although case law largely supports expansive application of RICO, there are still
inconsistencies in judicial interpretation of the proper breadth of RICO. See, e.g., JOSEPH, supqra note 181, at 3
(comparing Grider v. Texas Oil & Gas Corp., 868 F.2d 1147 (10th Cir. 1989), and Quaknine v. MeFarlane, 897
F.2d 75 (2d Cir. 1990) (rejecting the argument that a liberal interpretation of RICO mandates an expansion of
section 1962(a) beyond the "investment use" requirement for standing) with Busby v. Crown Supply, Inc., 896
F.2d 833 (4th Cir. 1990) (accepting the argument that a liberal interpretation of RICO mandates expansion of
RICO beyond the "investment use" requirement for standing).
206. See infra notes 367-368 and accompanying text (discussing the ramifications of this limitation of the
civil RICO cause of action).
207. American Int'l Group, Inc. v. Superior Court, 234 Cal. App. 3d 749, 768, 285 Cal. Rptr. 765, 777
(1991).
208. 234 Cal. App. 3d 749, 285 Cal. Rptr. 765 (1991).
209. Id.
210. 15 U.S.C.S. §§ 1011-1015 (1984).
211. 234 Cal. App. 3d at 768, 285 Cal. Rptr. at 777 (holding that RICO does not specifically relate to the
business of insurance, and therefore does not come within the exception set out in 15 U.S.C. § 10 12(b)). This
exception states that no Act of Congress may invalidate, impair, or supersede any State law which regulates the
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had an extensive statutory scheme of regulating the insurance industry,2
12
including a section which expressly prohibited the conduct which was
asserted by the plaintiff,23 the court refused to allow the federal RICO
Act to supersede state law.214 The court cited section 1012(b) of the
McCarran-Ferguson Act, which states that no act of Congress may
supersede any state law for the purpose of regulating the business of
insurance (unless the Act specifically relates to the business of
insurance). 215 The federal RICO Act does not specifically relate to the
business of insurance, so the only remedies available to the plaintiff were
either administrative proceedings authorized by state law, or common law
actions.216 The result of this decision is a legal one-way street: workers'
compensation insurers can use civil RICO to their advantage in fighting
fraudulent workers' compensation claims, yet are themselves immune from
civil RICO liability if they fraudulently withhold payment of workers'
compensation claims.
Bringing a Civil Action Under RICO
Section 1964(c) of Title 18 of the United States Code creates the civil
RICO cause of action and gives federal courts jurisdiction to hear civil
228 iRICO cases.2t7 Any person2" who is injured in the person's business
business of insurance unless the Act specifically relates to the business of insurance. 15 U.S.C. § 1012(b).
212. See generally CAL. INS. CODE. (setting forth the regulations which govern California's insurance
industry).
213. See CAL. INS. CODE § 790.03 (West Supp. 1993).
214. American Int'l Group, Inc. v. Superior Court, 234 Cal. App. 3d 749, 768, 285 Cal. Rptr. 765, 777
(1991). The Court employed a four-step analysis to determine if McCarran-Ferguson barred the application of
a federal statute: (1) Does RICO specifically relate to the business of insurance? (2) Do defendant's activities
constitute the business of insurance for purposes of McCarran-Ferguson? (3) If so, then has California enacted
any laws for the purpose of regulating such activities? (4) If so, would the application of RICO invalidate, impair
or supersede such laws? Id. at 758, 771. See hifra notes 267-272 and accompanying text (discussing the
McCarran-Ferguson Act).
215. American hit'l Group, Inc.. 234 Cal. App. 3d at 768, 285 Cal. Rptr. at 777; 15 U.S.C.S. § 1012(b)
(1984).
216. Id. at 768, 285 Cal. Rptr. at 777. The American International Group Court did not specifically
mention an antitrust suit as an available cause of action, however, an antitrust suit such as the Wellington
Complaint is possible because the antitrust exemption enjoyed by the insurance industry is only partial. See infra
notes 266-272 and accompanying text (discussing the partial exemption of the insurance industry to antitrust
laws).
217. 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (1991). See generally JOSEPH, supra note 181, at 5-22 (providing a complete
analysis of jurisdiction and venue for both state and federal civil RICO actions). Consistent with the underlying
liberal construction given RICO, the United States Supreme Court has recently ruled that state courts have
concurrent jurisdiction over civil RICO claims, reasoning that giving state courts the power to hear RICO claims
promotes the legislature's intent that RICO be broadly used to fight organized crime. Id. at 9 (citing Tafflin v.
Levitt, 493 U.S. 455, 464 (1990)); see id. at 9-18, 149-150 (discussing various issues raised by concurrent state
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or property by conduct prohibited under the RICO Act can sue in federal
district court for treble damages and the cost of the suit, including a
reasonable attorney's fee.219 There are three required elements for stating
a civil RICO claim. 220 The plaintiff must have suffered: (1) Injury in its
business or property because the defendant, (2) while involved in one or
more enumerated relationships with an enterprise,22' (3) engaged in a
pattern of racketeering activity. 22 These three elements of a civil RICO
suit are comprised of identifiable components which, in order to properly
plead a civil RICO suit, must be distinguishable.223 Aside from pleading
an injury, the plaintiff must also distinguish as separate entities the person
who is the defendant, the unlawful enterprise, and the pattern of
racketeering activity. Simply put, the defendant is not the unlawful
enterprise, but is a distinct entity who has merely associated with the
224enterprise. Similarly, the enterprise is not the pattern of racketeering
activity, even though the enterprise and the pattern are often established by
the same evidence. 22' The interrelationships between these three
and federal jurisdiction, such as removal, remand, abstention, arbitration and collateral estoppel).
218. See 18 U.S.C. 1961(3) (1991) (defining person as including any individual or entity capable of
holding a legal or beneficial interest in a property). This definition creates an extremely broad class of potential
plaintiffs, and civil RICO claims have been asserted by individuals, corporations, partnerships, labor unions,
churches, universities, estates, and governmental agencies. Landscape, supra note 185, at 27.
219. 1 U.S.C.S. § 1962(c) (1991). The full text of § 1962(c) states that:
It shall be unlawful for any person employed by or associated with any enterprise engaged in, or the
activities of which affect, interstate or foreign commerce, to conduct or participate, directly or
indirectly, in the conduct of such enterprise's affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity or
collection of unlawful debt.
Id.
220. Id.
221. See id. § 1961(4) (1991) (defining enterprise as including any individual, partnership, corporation,
association, or other legal entity, and any union or group of individuals associated in fact although not a legal
entity); infra notes 240-244 and accompanying text (discussing the issue of whether the enterprise must be an
entity separate from the defendant, with the requisite relationship between the enterprise and the defendant, or
whether the defendant and the enterprise can be the same entity).
222. 18 U.S.C.S. § 1962(c) (1991); see id. § 1961(1) (Supp. 1993) (defining racketeering activity);
Landscape, supra note 185, at 30 n.54 (summarizing § 1961(1)'s definition of racketeering activity as any act
engaged in by a person which is "chargeable" under several generically described state criminal laws, any act
"indictable" under several specific federal criminal provisions including the mail and wire fraud statutes, or any
"offense" involving bankruptcy or securities fraud or drug-related activities that is "punishable" under federal
law).
223. See JOSEPH, supra note 181 at 57.
224. Id. at 42.
225. United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 583 (1981); JOSEPH, supra note 181, at 62; see infra notes
236-254 and accompanying text (discussing the distinctions between the enterprise and the pattern of
racketeering activity).
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components have been a fruitful source of confusion in civil RICO
litigation.226
The first requirement for a civil RICO suit is injury to the plaintiffs
business or property. Courts have been consistent in recognizing that
recovery for personal injuries is not compensable under RICO.227 Prior
to 1985, RICO's close relationship to section Four of the Clayton Act 228
prompted some courts to require civil RICO plaintiffs to allege illegal
antitrust activity that placed them at a competitive disadvantage in the
marketplace. 229 This impediment was removed in the landmark case of
Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co.230 In Sedima, the United States Supreme
Court eliminated the antitrust injury requirement, stating that a claim may
be brought under section 1964(c) so long as the defendant has engaged in
a pattern of racketeering activities" which injured the plaintiff in the
plaintiff's business or property.232 The Sedima Court held that recovery
under section 1964(c) was not limited to injuries that are competitive in
nature because the statute expressly granted recovery to any person injured
in the person's business or property. 3 While the dissent in Sedima
cautioned that too broad a reading of the civil RICO statute would validate
uses of the statute that were never intended by Congress, the majority
opened the door for a wide variety of plaintiffs in finding that the
competitive-injury and racketeering-injury requirements imposed by earlier
courts were inconsistent with RICO's language and legislative history. 3
The burgeoning use of civil RICO in the area of workers' compensation
226. See JOSEPH, supra note 181, at 41.
227. Landscape, supra note 185, at 27-28 n.43 (citing numerous cases which have held that the business
or property requirement of the RICO Act excludes redress for personal injuries suffered).
228. 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1985) (codifying section 4 of the Clayton Act, which provides the remedy of treble
damages, the cost of the suit, and reasonable attorney's fees to any person who has been injured in his business
or property by any action forbidden in the antitrust laws); see supra note 190-192 and accompanying text (noting
that the Clayton Act was the basis for the civil RICO treble damages remedy).
229. Landscape, supra note 185, at 27-28.
230. 473 U.S. 479 (1985).
231. See 18 U.S.C.S. § 1961(1) (Supp. 1993) (defining racketeering activity).
232. Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S., at 495.
233. Id. at 497 n.15. The Court reasoned that, had Congress intended to limit recovery to competitive
injuries, they would not have granted recovery for injuries to property. Id. But see id. at 523-530 (Powell, J.,
dissenting) (taking exception to this distinction and stating that Congress did intend to limit recovery to
competitive injuries).
234. Sedinma, 473 U.S. at 497 n.15 (holding that civil RICO damages are not limited to competitive injury);
id. at 493-500, (holding that civil RICO damages are likewise not limited to racketeering injury); see supra notes
185-192 and accompanying text (discussing the legislative history of RICO).
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fraud illustrates the continued strength of the expansive Sedima precedent
of redressing non-antitrust injuries.235
The second step for pleading a civil RICO complaint is to allege the
existence of an enterprise.23 6 The definition of a RICO enterprise is
extremely broad, thereby assuring the application of RICO to a wide range
of conduct.23 7 Section 1961(4) of the RICO Act defines enterprise as
including any individual, partnership, corporation, association, or other
legal entity, as well as any union or group of individuals associated in fact
although not a legal entity.238 This absence of a requirement that the
enterprise be based on a legally recognized relationship allows a civil
RICO plaintiff to use circumstantial evidence to establish the existence of
an enterprise, significantly enhancing the scope of civil RICO.239
The plaintiff must then allege that the defendant was involved in one
or more enumerated relationships with this enterprise which affects
interstate or foreign commerce.240 The relationship requirement of section
1962(c) raises a troublesome issue. In order to establish a relationship there
must, by definition, be two distinct parties.24' This relationship
requirement brings up the question of whether a civil RICO defendant may
also be the enterprise, or whether the enterprise must be an entity distinct
from the defendant.242 If a civil RICO defendant and enterprise are one
in the same, then a paradoxical situation arises whereby the requisite
relationship element exists between a single entity.243 Almost all courts
confronted by the separate entity issue have concluded that the section
1962(c) enterprise requirement assumes that the defendant and the
enterprise are two distinct entities.24'
235. See infra notes 366-367 and accompanying text (discussing the use of civil RICO suits as a cost-
effective method of litigating fraudulent workers' compensation claims).
236. 18 U.S.C.S. § 1962(c) (1991).
237. Landscape, supra note 185, at 32.
238. 18 U.S.C.S. § 1961(4) (1991). Even entirely illegitimate enterprises may be RICO enterprises. United
States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 580-81 (1981).
239. See, e.g., Zenith Complaint, supra note 19; see also ihfra notes 317-328 and accompanying text
(discussing Zenith's use of circumstantial evidence to allege the existence of an enterprise).
240. 18 U.S.C.S. § 1962(c) (1991).
241. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1288 (6th ed. 1990) (defining relation as the connection of two
persons, or their situation with respect to each other).
242. Landscape, supra note 185 at 32-36 (discussing the distinct entity issue in terms of §§ 1962(a),
1962(b), and 1962(c)).
243. See supra note 241 and accompanying text (defining relation as involving two or more entities).
244. Landscape. supra note 185, at 36; see id. 36-37 n.85-86 (citing numerous district court and United
States Supreme Court opinions which have concluded, as a matter of law, that the enterprise and the defendant
remain distinct entities, and citing United States v. Hartley, 678 F.2d 961, 988 (11th Cir.) as an example of the
minority of cases which has held that a corporation may be simultaneously both a defendant and the § 1962(c)
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Once the plaintiff has established an injury in its business or property,
and the defendant's relationship with an enterprise, the third step for
pleading a civil RICO complaint is to allege that the defendant was
engaged in a pattern of racketeering activity.245 While the definition of
"enterprise" in section 1961(4) is meant to be purely illustrative, 46 the
laundry list of predicate acts enumerated in the definition of racketeering
activity in section 1961(1) is meant to be exhaustive. 47 Therefore, the
plaintiff must allege conduct specifically enumerated in the definition of
1961 (1).248 Common examples of prohibited non-violent racketeering
activity include mail fraud,249 wire fraud,250 and embezzlement from
pension and welfare funds. 1
RICO requires more than proof of the existence of an enterprise which
has engaged in racketeering activity: the plaintiff must prove multiple acts
of racketeering activity sufficient to constitute a pattern. 252 The Sedima
Court stated that two acts were necessary to establish a pattern, but that
two isolated acts may not be sufficient.23 Thus, under Sedima a
combination of continuity plus relationship is required to produce a
pattern.254
In the event that a group of workers' compensation insurance
companies form an enterprise which engages in a pattern of racketeering
activity for the purpose of fraudulently withholding payment of valid
enterprise).
245. 18 U.S.C.S. § 1962(c) (1991). See 18 U.S.C.S. § 1961(1) (Supp. 1993) (including within the
definition of racketeering activity such things as: threats involving murder or kidnapping; dealing dangerous
drugs; bribery; counterfeiting; embezzlement; mail and wire fraud; tampering with, or retaliating against, a
witness; money laundering; sexual exploitation of children; and embezzlement from union funds).
246. See JOSEPH, supra note 181, at 63 (noting that § 1961(4) provides that the term enterprise "includes"
the list that follows, and is thus only illustrative of the types of entities which may constitute an enterprise).
247. 18 U.S.C.S. § 1961(1) (Supp. 1993) (defining racketeering activity); JOSEPH, supra note 181, at 62-63.
The Sedina court held that racketeering activity consists of no more and no less than the commission of a
predicate act. Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., Inc., 473 U.S. 479, 495 (1985). See Miranda v. Ponce Fed. Bank,
948 F.2d 41, 48 (1st Cir. 1991) (stating that the list of predicate acts in 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1) was intended by
Congress to be complete).
248. See JOSEPH, supra note 181, at 63.
249. See 18 U.S.C.S. § 1341 (1991) (defining mail fraud and making it a federal crime); see Zenith
Complaint, supra note 19, at 21-22 (alleging mail fraud as a basis for establishing racketeering activity).
250. See 18 U.S.C.S. § 1343 (1991) (defining wire fraud and making it a federal crime).
251. See id. § 1961(1) (Supp. 1993) (including mail fraud, wire fraud, and embezzlement from pension
and welfare funds within the definition of racketeering activity); id. § 664 (1991) (defining embezzlement from
pension and welfare funds and making it a federal crime).
252. Id. § 1961(5) (1991) (defining pattern of racketeering activity as requiring at least two acts of
racketeering activity).
253. Sedimna, 473 U.S. at 496 n.14.
254. Id.; Landscape, supra note 185, at 46.
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workers' compensation claims, a plaintiff may not bring a civil RICO suit
against the fraudulent workers' compensation insurers. This is due to the
American International Group precedent barring the civil RICO suit from
application against insurance companies due to pre-emption by state laws
regulating the insurance industry.25 Under current law, a plaintiff in this
situation must instead resort to administrative remedies available under
California's Insurance Code, or to the rempdies provided by common law.
The common law equivalent to the treble damages civil RICO remedy is
an antitrust suit. A brief consideration of the extensive body of antitrust
law highlights a significant disparity in the common law as it pertains to
workers' compensation fraud: the high likelihood that an insurer will be
successful in bringing a civil RICO suit against fraudulent claimants, and
the remote likelihood that a claimant will be successful in bringing an
antitrust suit against fraudulent insurers.
B. The Narrow Policy of Antitrust Law
In contrast to the relative youth of civil RICO, the common law origin
of antitrust law goes back more than 500 years to an action which upheld
an apprentice's right to compete with his master. 1 6 Although the roots
of antitrust law are embedded in the common law, contemporary treatment
of antitrust law is largely statutory.257 This Comment considers the
application of antitrust law to the workers' compensation insurance
industry. As such, only those aspects of antitrust law which touch upon
workers' compensation insurance are examined.25 8
255. See supra notes 207-216 and accompanying text (discussing the American Int'l Group, Inc. v.
Superior Court decision).
256. Dyer's Case, supra note 183.
257. 1 B.E. WITKIN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW, Contracts § 544 (9th ed. 1987).
258. The reader is encouraged to review the large body of literature for a more in-depth treatment of this
fascinating area of law. See, e.g., ABA ANTITRUST SECTION, ANTITRUST LAW DEVELOPMENTS (3d ed. 1992);
PHILLIP AREEDA AND Louis KAPLOW, ANTITRUST ANALYSIS PROBLEMS, TEXT, CASEs-1991 SUPPLEMENT (4th
ed. 1988); TERRY CALVANI AND JOHN SIEGFRIED, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS AND ANTITRUST LAW (2d ed. 1988);
CARLA A. HILLS, ANTITRUST ADVISER (1971); ERNEST GELLHORN, ANTITRUST LAW AND ECONOMICS IN A
NUTSHELL (3d ed. 1986); PHILIP C. JONES, LITIGATING PRIVATE ANTITRUST ACTIONS (1984); MARIA P. RIVERA,
ANTITRUST PRIMER: BASICS OF ANTITRUST LAW AND INVESTIGATION, NATIONAL DISTRICT ATTORNEYS ASSOC.,
(1980); STEPHEN F. ROSS, PRINCIPLES OF ANTITRUST LAW (1993); LAWRENCE ANTHONY SULLIVAN, HANDBOOK
OF THE LAW OF ANTITRUST (1977); 54 AM. JUR. 2D, Monopolies, Restraints of Trade, and Unfair Trade
Practices § 3, at 669 (1971).
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The underlying foundation of antitrust law is the tenet that competition
reigns supreme. 9 While RICO reaches an ever-expanding variety of
business conduct wholly unrelated to competition,2 ° antitrust policy
dictates that it be applied only to specific business conduct which
adversely impacts competition.261 This procompetition policy behind
antitrust law is based on the belief that protection of competition ultimately
protects the public welfare through efficient use of economic
resources. 262 The Sherman Act263  is the principal federal antitrust
statute, and proscribes all agreements among competitors that unreasonably
restrict competition.26 Conduct is deemed unreasonable when it
eliminates or reduces competition without yielding economic benefits (i.e.,
an unreasonable restraint of trade).265
259. Turner, The Durability, Relevance, and Future of American Antitrust Policy, 75 CAL. L. REV. 797,
798 (1987).
260. See Pub. L. No. 91-452, § 904, 84 Stat. 947 (1970) (calling for broad and liberal interpretation of
RICO in order to more effectively fight the serious threat posed by organized crime); JOSEPH, supra note 181,
at 62-81 (discussing the wide variety of non-competitive conduct to which RICO applies).
261. Columbia v. Omni Outdoor Advertising, Inc., 499 U.S. 365, 400 (1991) (noting that a conspiracy
which involves an element of unlawfulness other than anticompetitive motivation has nothing to do with the
policies of antitrust law); SULLIVAN, supra note 258, at 20 (stating that antitrust law is limited to anticompetitive
business conduct); Turner, supra note 259 (making the same assertion); see supra notes 185-205 and
accompanying text (discussing the expansionist policy behind the RICO Act).
262. Northern Pac. R. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 4 (1958); Turner, supra note 259, at 798 (noting
that the protection of competition is necessary to protect consumer welfare). To apply antitrust law in non-
competitive situations, even for the attainment of the most worthy societal goals, would inject vagueness into
the antitrust arena and risk dampening legitimate business conduct. Id. See generally 1 PHILIP AREEDA & D.
TURNER, ANTITRUST LAW M 103-112 (1978) and 4 PHILIP AREEDA & D. TURNER, ANTTRusT LAW 903-904
(1980) (discussing the issues concerning antitrust goals).
263. 15 U.S.C.S. § I (Supp. 1993).
264. See NCAA v. Board of Regents, 468 U.S. 85, 98 (1984); National Soc'y of Professional Eng'rs v.
United States, 435 U.S. 679, 687-91 (1978); Continental T.V., Inc., v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 49
(1977); Chicago Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918); Standard Oil Co. v. United States,
221 U.S. 1, 58 (1911) (consistently holding that only unreasonable restraints on competition violate § I of the
Sherman Act, since every trade agreement or regulation restrains trade in some way); ABA Antitrust Section,
supra note 258, at 1-2 (noting that the Sherman Act states that every contract, combination, or conspiracy to
restrain trade is illegal, and therefore, a literal reading of the Act would prohibit all concerted activity to restrain
trade); 15 U.S.C.S. § 1 (1988).
265. 15 U.S.C.S. § 1 (1988); see Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 310 U.S. 469, 493 (1940) (stating that the
Sherman Act was enacted to prevent restraints to free competition which tended to restrict production, raise
prices or otherwise control the market to the detriment of purchasers of goods and services). The Sherman Act
and its progeny were not aimed at protecting individual competitors, but rather the promotion of procompetitive
conduct as a whole. Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477,488 (1977); Turner, supra note
259, at 798; Note, Antitrust Standing, Antitrust Izjury, and the Per Se Standing, 93 YALE LJ. 1309, 1310
(1984).
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Not all anti-competitive practices are subject to federal 66 antitrust
laws. The McCarran-Ferguson Act267 exempts from federal antitrust law
those areas of the insurance industry which are subject to state regulation,
including workers' compensation.2 68 Given the fact that the underlying
policy of antitrust law is the protection of the public welfare, Congress
chose to allow the States to authorize anti-competitive practices which they
believed to be in the public interest.269  The McCarran-Ferguson Act
specifically exempts the "business of insurance" from antitrust
liability.270  Under this exemption, insurers may lawfully collect and
exchange information pertaining to patterns of submission of falsified
claims. 2 7' They may not, however, engage in price fixing, since this
conduct would adversely impact competition.272
In addition to the proscription against a concerted agreement to fix
prices, insurance companies may not band together in an agreement to
refuse to deal with a particular market participant (i.e., a group
boycott), 3  since even when the motivation behind the boycott is to
drive fraudulent enterprises from business, an unlawful means is
266. California law does not apply here because Federal law expressly bars boycotts, coercion, and
intimidation. As such, State law can not authorize something that Federal law expressly prohibits.
267. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011-1015 (1984).
268. 15 U.S.C. § 1012(b) (1984) (exempting conduct which relates to the business of insurance to the
extent that such business is regulated by State law).
269. Saint Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Barry, 438 U.S. 531, 565 (1978) (Stewart, J., dissenting).
270. 15 U.S.C. § 1012(b) (1984) (exempting the business of insurance to the extent that such business is
regulated by state law); see Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 113 S. Ct. 2891, 2901 (1993) (stating that the
McCarran-Ferguson Act did not exempt the "business of insurance companies," but rather, the business of
insurance) (emphasis added). The Court explained that the "business of insurance" singles out one activity from
others, rather than distinguishing one entiy from another. Id.
271. DEPARTMENT Or JUSTICE, STATE OF CALIFORNIA, ANTITRUST GUIDELINES FOR THE INSURANCE
INDUSTRY 44 (Mar. 1990). This exchange of information is allowable because it is not seen as relating to price
fixing. Id.
272. United States v. Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U.S. 392,397 (1926). See ANTITRUST GUIDELINES, supra
note 271, at 16-18 (discussing various agreements which have been construed as price fixing).
273. ABA ANTITRUST SECTION, supra note 258, at 77; ANTITRUST GUIDELINES, supra note 271, at 18-19
(stating that group boycotts against customers or suppliers, as well as competitors are per se illegal). See infra
notes 288-292 and accompanying text (discussing the per se doctrine). A concerted refusal to deal is the most
common type of boycott described in antitrust litigation in the insurance industry. See, e.g., Hartford Fire Ins.
Co. v. California, 113 S. Ct. 2891, 2895-2900 (1993) (alleging a group boycott by a group of primary insurers
and reinsurers). When the economic harm of a group refusal to deal is not readily apparent, then federal antitrust
law may not treat a group refusal to deal as a per se illegal boycott. ANTITRUST GUIDELINES, supra note 271,
at 18-19. See infra notes 344-351 and accompanying text (discussing the minute order in the Wellington case,
in which Judge Hupp stated that the alleged conduct of Zenith was not the type of conduct which the per se
doctrine was designed to cover).
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unjustified.274 Therefore, an alleged boycott by an insurer negates
McCarran-Ferguson immunity from antitrust liability.27 Once outside
this antitrust immunity, the activity is closely scrutinized to determine
whether or not it rises to the level of a boycott.276 A pattern of uniform
business conduct by competitors, known as conscious parallelism, is
277usually the basis for allegations of such a concerted action. But a
strong case of parallelism, whereby various competitors are engaging in
unexplained parallel conduct, is still not enough to create an inference of
unlawful conspiracy.278 Instead, courts view parallelism as one of many
factors to be weighed in supporting an inference of concerted action.279
Other circumstances, called "plus factors," are added to the mix, and the
behavior of the defendants is then viewed as a whole.2"0  These plus
factors include actions which evince similarity of language, terms, and
conditions where such similarity is improbable, absent collusion.28' An
important plus factor is proof that the conduct would be contrary to the
parties' self-interest if they acted alone.282 If sound business reasons exist
274. See, e.g., Paramount Famous Lasky Corp. v. United States, 282 U.S. 30, 43 (1930) (stating that the
interest of the public in the preservation of competition is the primary consideration of the Sherman Act, and
that good motives do not exonerate unlawful activity under the statute). The Court noted that law is not to be
compromised in accommodating good intentions of parties, or in obtaining some good results. Id. It is likewise
unlawful to conspire to drive a party out of business by spreading the information that he is morally and
financially unreliable, and has a criminal record. McCann v. New York Stock Exchange, 107 F.2d 908, 912 (2d
Cir. 1939). While the withholding of payment for the sole purpose of driving a creditor out of business is not
specifically prohibited by law, numerous Supreme Court holdings have easily jumped this hurdle. See, e.g.,
Fashion Originators' Guild of Am. v. Federal Trade Comm'n, 312 U.S. 457, 463 (1941) (stating that the
Sherman and Clayton Acts did not define specific categories of prohibited conduct, but were instead prophylactic
regulations designed to eliminate any type of activity which might lead to undesirable trade restraints and
practices); Saint Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Barry, 438 U.S. 531, 552 (1978) (holding that the Sherman
Antitrust Act prohibited concerted refusals to do business with a particular person or business in order to obtain
concessions or to express displeasure with certain acts or practices).
275. See, e.g., Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 113 S. Ct. 2891, 2913 (1993) (stating that a group
boycott is not exempted from liability under the McCarran-Ferguson Act).
276. See infra notes 288-303 and accompanying text (discussing the per se and Rule of Reason doctrines,
which are the two doctrines under which conduct is scrutinized to determine whether such conduct violates
antitrust law).
277. ABA ANTITRUST SECTION, supra note 258, at 5.
278. In re Workers Compensation Ins. Antitrust Litig., 867 F.2d 1552, 1563, 1566 (8th Cir. 1989), cert.
denied, 492 U.S. 920 (1989).
279. ABA ANTITRUST SECTION, supra note 258, at 6.
280. In re Workers Compensation Ins. Antitrust Litig., supra note 278, at 1563, 1566 (stating that the
overall conduct of the defendants must be weighed).
281. ABA ANTITRUST SECTION, supra note 258, at 7-10 (discussing the various plus factors which have
been employed by Courts in considering circumstantial evidence of unlawful conspiracies).
282. Todorov v. DCH Healthcare Auth., 921 F.2d 1438, 1456 n.30 (11th Cir. 1991) (stating that the
plaintiff must establish that, if there were no conspiracy, each defendant engaging in the parallel action would
be acting contrary to its economic self-interest). See infra notes 368-371 and accompanying text (noting that
there is ample reason for any individual insurance company to engage in a unilateral practice of withholding
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by which defendants can justify the challenged conduct, then a finding of
conspiracy is unlikely.283
Once a court finds that a conspiracy exists, the conduct is then
scrutinized under one of two doctrines to determine whether or not the
challenged conduct falls within the umbrella of antitrust law: the per se
doctrine or the Rule of Reason."' Each is distinct in its application, and
is used exclusive of the other.285 The differences between these two
doctrines amount to a decisive impact on the likelihood that an antitrust
suit will be successful.286 As such, the judicial determination of whether
conduct is examined under the per se doctrine or the Rule of Reason is
crucial, and can sometimes be the determining factor in a plaintiff's
decision to continue litigating or pursue an out-of-court settlement.287
The Per Se Doctrine and The Rule of Reason
Under the per se doctrine,288  a court makes a preliminary
determination as to whether the challenged conduct is per se illegal.2
89
A finding of per se illegality means that the defendants' conduct is seen
as so restrictive of competition (rather than one designed to increase
economic efficiency and render markets more, rather than less,
competitive) that it is conclusively unreasonable, making further
examination of the reasons for the challenged practice and its effects
irrelevant.290 A per se ruling ends the case in favor of the plaintiff,
allowing the plaintiff to forego the expense of drawn out litigation which
is usually required under the Rule of Reason.29' Just as the civil RICO
payment for valid workers' compensation claims).
283. Todorov, 921 F.2d at 1456.
284. SULLIVAN, supra note 258, at 153.
285. Id.
286. Id.
287. See ANTITST GUIDELINES, supra note 271, at 16 (noting that the limitation of per se rules has
resulted in more complex litigation and uncertainty among prosecutors); infra notes 288-303 and accompanying
text (discussing the per se and Rule of Reason doctrines, and noting that the Rule of Reason involves much more
complex inquiry into the nature of the conduct).
288. See Broadcast Music, Inc., v. CBS, 441 U.S. 1, 19-20 (1979) (stating that the per se doctrine renders
per se illegal practice which facially appears to be one that would always or almost always tend to restrict
competition and decrease output).
289. SULLIVAN, supra note 258, at 153.
290. Broadcast Music, 441 U.S. at 8, 19-20.
291. United States v. Realty Multi-List, Inc., 629 F.2d 1351, 1362-63 (5th Cir. 1980) (calling the per se
rule the "trump card" of antitrust law which allows an antitrust plaintiff who successfully plays it to simply tally
his score); ABA ANTITRUST SECrION, supra note 258, at 33; see infra notes 293-298 and accompanying text
(discussing the Rule of Reason doctrine).
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cause of action provides insurance companies with a cost effective method
of litigating numerous contested claims, a per se analysis would provide
a plaintiff with a cost effective method of litigating an antitrust suit
concerning the fraudulent withholding of numerous valid claims. The
plaintiff would only need to prove that the defendant actually engaged in
the alleged conduct.
292
A plaintiff who is unsuccessful in a plea for per se scrutiny must then
turn to the Rule of Reason.293 In contrast to a per se analysis, the Rule
of Reason involves a complicated and prolonged economic investigation
into the entire history of the industry involved, including the nature,
purpose and effect of the challenged conduct.294 This complex inquiry is
necessary to determine whether a particular restraint is unreasonable, since
only unreasonable restraints on competition are unlawful.2 95 Due to the
desirability of maintaining a free market without undue restraints on
legitimate business practices, public policy often plays a large part in a
court's consideration of the reasonableness of a defendant's conduct.296
This public policy orientation can significantly impact a plaintiff's chance
of succeeding in an antitrust suit.297  In the workers' compensation
insurance setting, a Rule of Reason analysis would most likely consider the
expressed intent of Congress to defer to the states the regulation of
insurance, as well as the great harm that fraudulent workers' compensation
mills have on the public welfare, and thus face a costly uphill battle.2 98
In reviewing the case law surrounding both RICO and antitrust
violations, the complexity of successfully pleading such a violation is
292. See United States v. Realty Multi-List, Inc., 629 F.2d at 1362-63 (noting that further inquiry is
unnecessary, once conduct deemed per se illegal is proven).
293. SULLIVAN, supra note 258, at 153. Where conduct does not obviously stifle competition, but may
adversely affect it, the Rule of Reason is the appropriate analysis. Id. at 169-70.
294. Northern Pac. R. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 4-5 (1958). A plaintiff bringing suit under the Rule
of Reason must show not only that the challenged conduct was an unreasonable restraint on trade, but also that
the plaintiff suffered direct injury as a result of the unreasonable conduct. JONES, supra note 258, § 19.05, at
351-52. This standing requirement allows courts to limit the parties which may sue for injuries sustained by
reason of an antitrust violation. Id., § 18.02, at 327 (emphasis in original). The determination is made based on
the pleadings, and assumes that the allegations and damages are true. Id.
295. Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 103 (1911). Standard Oil was the case from which
evolved the concept that contracts and conspiracies which inhibit competition are prohibited only if they are
unreasonable, thus giving modern recognition to the 200 year old Rule of Reason. GELLHORN, snpra note 258,
at 3-5. The Rule of Reason was first applied in 1711 in Mitchel v. Reynolds, I P.Wms. 181, 24 Eng.Rep. 347
(1711). Id.
296. JONES, supra note 258, § 26.02, at 415.
297. Id., § 26.02, at 415.
298. See, e.g., infra note 349-351 and accompanying text (noting that, once the Wellington plaintiffs were
required to prove their case under a Rule of Reason analysis, they settled with the defendants because the case
became prohibitively expensive).
351
Pacific Law Journal / Vol. 25
apparent.299 While RICO has expanded beyond anticompetitive conduct,
antitrust law is confined to anticompetitive actions.30 Given this
limitation to anticompetitive conduct, it is highly unlikely that conduct
which does not obviously impair competition will be scrutinized under the
per se doctrine of antitrust law.301  The complexity and expense of
bringing suit under the rule of reason amounts to a significant burden on
such an antitrust plaintiff. 2 This is most evident in the recent litigation
between Zenith Insurance Company and various medical care
providers. °3
III. CIVIL LITIGATION BETWEEN ZENITH AND WELLINGTON
In November of 1991, Zenith Insurance Company ("Zenith") brought
a civil RICO suit in United States District Court, Central District of
California against Wellington Medical Corporation, American
Psychometric Consultants, and five former workers of the La Serre
restaurant in Sherman Oaks, California (collectively referred to as
"Wellington").3°4 The suit alleged that the defendants filed fraudulent
workers' compensation claims, submitted false medical-legal evaluations,
and billed for unnecessary services."' A countersuit was filed by
299. See supra notes 180-298 and accompanying text (discussing the background of the RICO Act and
antitrust law).
300. Columbia v. Omni Outdoor Advertising, Inc., 499 U.S. 365, 400 (1991) (noting that a conspiracy
which involves an element of unlawfulness other than anticompetitive motivation has nothing to do with the
policies of antitrust law); SULLIVAN, supra note 258, at 20 (stating that antitrust law is limited to anticompetitive
business conduct); Turner, supra note 259 (making the same assertion).
301. SULLIVAN, supra note 258, at 169-70; see, e.g., Princeton Medical Corp., et al. v. Zenith Ins. Co.,
et al., No. CV 91-6866-HLH (C.D. Cal. filed May 18, 1992) (in which the Wellington plaintiffs were told to
drop their per se violation theory because the suit would be analyzed under the rule of reason).
302. See supra notes 293-301 and accompanying text (describing the difficulty and expense of proving
antitrust violations under the Rule of Reason).
303. See infra notes 330-360 and accompanying text (discussing the Wellington antitrust suit and the
eventual out-of-court settlement).
304. Zenith Complaint, supra note 19.
305. Id.; see Louise Kertesz, Work Comp Fraud Allegations Boil Over; Insurer's complaint Triggers
Countersuit By Medical Clinics, Bus. INS., Feb. 3, 1992, at 21, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Busins File
(discussing the allegations of the suit and reporting that the owner of defendant Wellington Medical Corporation,
Dr. Bryon Crawford, had previously agreed to pay the Workers Compensation Appeals Board $20,000 in a case
which alleged that he had employed unqualified personnel to ghostwrite medical-legal evaluations of workers
compensation claimants). The type of behavior alleged by Zenith is not covered by newly enacted California
Insurance Code § 1871.7, which provides the statutory right for any interested party to bring civil action for the
crime of employing runners, cappers, or steerers to procure workers' compensation claimants. 1993 Cal. Legis.
Serv. ch. 120, sec. 3.3, at 1048 (enacting CAL. INS. CODE § 1871.7(e)(1)). See supra notes 156-164 and
accompanying text (discussing newly enacted legislation which addresses fraud within the workers'
compensation).
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Wellington, alleging that Zenith violated antitrust laws in a vigilante-style
effort to fight what Wellington asserted were legitimate claims.3 6 The
eventual out-of-court settlement of these suits, as well as several similar
civil RICO actions brought by Zenith against other workers' compensation
mills, indicates that the civil RICO cause of action will be a major factor
in curbing fraud in California's workers' compensation system.
30 7
A. Zenith Insurance Company v. American Psychometric Consultants,
Inc.308
On November 18, 1991, Zenith Insurance Company filed a suit against
various workers' compensation claimants, interpreters, doctors,
psychologists, and an attorney in U.S. District Court in Los Angeles.30 9
In the suit, Zenith alleged that American Psychometric Consultants
("APC"), Wellington Medical Corporation, and the law firm of Glen A.
Lintner, formed an enterprise3 "0  for submitting and prosecuting
fraudulent and exaggerated workers' compensation claims in which
extensive reciprocal referrals were used.31' In its complaint, Zenith
alleged that an enterprise existed whereby the defendant law firm and
medical clinics all solicited either healthy employees who were willing to
submit fraudulent claims, or injured, ill, or disabled workers who would
submit exaggerated or inflated claims for workers' compensation
benefits. Claimants who first came to the Lintner firm were
represented in all efforts to obtain payment of benefits or settlement, and
were then allegedly referred to the defendant medical clinics for extensive
medical-legal evaluations which included psychological examination and
306. Princeton Complaint, supra note 20, at 7-14; see Kertesz, supra note 305, at 21 (discussing the
allegations of the countersuit). See supra notes 174-175 and accompanying text (setting forth the complete list
of plaintiffs and defendants in the two suits, who have been simplified in this Comment to "Zenith" and
"Wellington" for the sake of clarity).
307. See Stuart Silverstein, Deal Reached hI Workers' Comp Suit, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 18, 1992, Part D at
1, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, LAT File (reporting on the settlement terms between Wellington Medical
Corporation and Zenith Insurance Company, and noting Zenith's intent to proceed to trial against American
Psychometric Consultants, the medical group that referred the workers to Wellington Medical Clinic); Zenith
Insurance Co. Reaches Settlement, BUs. WIRE, Oct. 1, 1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, BWIRE File
[hereinafter Settlement] (reporting that Zenith Insurance Company reached a settlement with American
Psychometric Consultants and providing a description of the settlement terms).
308. Zenith Comphint, supra note 19.
309. Id.
310. See 18 U.S.C § 1961(4) (1991) (defining enterprise for the purposes of RICO).
311. Zenith Complaint, supra note 19, at 7-8.
312. Id. at 7-9.
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treatment in order to exaggerate and inflate the medical bills.313
Claimants who first came to the defendant medical clinics were allegedly
referred to Lintner for representation.3 14 The Lintner firm would always
retain the defendant medical clinics to provide medical-legal evaluations
for all claims contested by Zenith.315 Zenith further alleged that A&W
Interpreting Services, a firm which assisted in medical-legal evaluations by
interpreting for Spanish-speaking claimants, was used for English-speaking
claimants in order to inflate and exaggerate the fraudulent claims.
316
Zenith's complaint was based on allegations stemming from the
employment of five workers by La Serre Restaurant in Sherman Oaks,
California.31' In June of 1991, all five workers quit La Serre and went
to work for Villas Garden, a nearby restaurant managed by Eduardo
Sanchez, a former La Serre employee.38 At the same time, Sanchez had
a workers' compensation claim pending against La Serre, in which he had
been diagnosed by APC as being disabled from psychological stress.319
Despite this purported disability, Sanchez was working at Villas Garden
at the time.320 APC had billed Zenith for the medical evaluation and
treatment of Sanchez, had referred him to Wellington for additional
evaluation and treatment, and referred him to A&W Interpreting Services
for unnecessary interpretation, all of which was billed to Zenith.32'
On July 5th, 1991, the five claimants visited APC and were all
identically diagnosed as being disabled due to psychological stress and
trauma.322 In billing Zenith for the examination and treatment of the five
claimants, APC submitted five identical bills for evaluation and treatment
performed by a single APC employee on July 5th. The bills showed that,
on July 5th, each claimant received 18.10 hours of psychological testing
and evaluation by David Leonelli, an assistant at APC.323 Aside from the
fact that the total hours billed for treatment administered by the same
employee to the same claimants on the same day was 90.5 hours, the
itemization of the time spent for the various tests was grossly exaggerated
313. Id.
314. Id.
315. Id. at 9.
316. Id. at 7-9.
317. Id. at 10.
318. Id.
319. Id
320. Id.
321. Id.
322. Id. at 11-12.
323. Id. at 12-13.
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and broken down identically for each bill.324 The individual responses in
the tests given to each claimant were conspicuously indistinguishable, even
though the answers were typically responses to either incomplete sentences
or single-words. 325 The medical-legal evaluations of the five claimants
contained identical diagnoses and lengths of disability, stating that the
claimants (who were all working at Villas Garden at the time of their July
5th evaluations) would be unable to work until October 8, 1991 due to
disabling conditions which all coincidentally began on May 20, 1991.326
Zenith also charged that APC referred the claimants to the Lintner firm
after their July 5th evaluations in order to justify the medical-legal
evaluations done by APC.327  Similar conduct of unnecessary
examinations, fraudulent reports, and exaggerated medical bills was alleged
against Wellington Medical Corporation.328
B. Princeton Medical Corp., et al., v. Zenith Insurance Company3
29
Wellington330  filed suit against Zenith and other insurance
companies33' on December 17, 1991, alleging violations of antitrust
laws.332 In this suit, Wellington alleged that the defendants had engaged
in an illegal conspiracy and combination for the purpose of forming an
unlawful group boycott or concerted refusal to deal with the plaintiff
medical clinics, and to fix the terms of payments to be made to the
plaintiffs.333 Wellington claimed that the ultimate. goal of the conspiracy
was to reduce the revenues of the medical care providers and drive them
324. Id. An example of the type of exaggerated time itemization used by APC is the allotment of 3.5 hours
to administer the Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory test, which is actually a self-administered test.
Id. at 13. These five identically itemized bills were also identical to the itemized bill submitted to Zenith on
behalf of Sanchez. Id. at 13.
325. Id. at 13-16.
326. Id. at 16.
327. Id. at 18. Medical-legal evaluations are needed only for proving or disproving contested claims,
therefore this act of referring the claimants to Lintner after the medical-legal evaluations were already done was
unlawful. CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 8, § 9793 (1993) (defining medical-legal report, for the purpose of determining
the medical-legal range of charges, as meaning all initial comprehensive medical-legal reports submitted in order
to prove or disprove a contested claim); CAL. LAB. CODE § 4620 (West 1989) (defining medical-legal expenses
as any costs and expenses incurred by or on behalf of any party, the administrative director, the board, or a
referee for X-rays, laboratory fees, other diagnostic tests, medical reports, medical records, medical testimony,
and, as needed, interpreter's fees, for the purpose of proving or disproving a contested claim).
328. Id. at 18-23.
329. Princeton Complaint, supra note 20.
330. "Wellington" is collectively used for the entire group of plaintiffs. See supra note 175.
331. See supra note 175.
332. Princeton Complaint, supra note 20, at 7-12.
333. Id. at 7-8.
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out of business, thereby reducing the number of workers' compensation
claims against Zenith.334
Wellington contended that Zenith and the other defendants had engaged
in an unlawful conspiracy to drive Wellington from business by various
illegal practices. 335 First, it was alleged that they had adopted uniform
changes in payment policies by refusing to pay medical-legal evaluations
and treatment expenses in a timely manner.336 Second, the defendants
purportedly adopted uniform pretextual objections to stress claims,
medical-legal evaluation charges, and treatment expenses submitted by
Wellington by characterizing the claims as fraudulent or false.337 Third,
virtually identical communication policies were supposedly adopted by the
defendant insurance companies, which mandated that all communications
with Wellington be in writing, resulting in increases in Wellington's cost
of doing business and delayed negotiation and payment of claims.338
Fourth, Wellington accused the defendants of telling other insurers that
Wellington was engaged in illegal business practices and of encouraging
other insurers and employers to likewise refuse to deal with Wellington in
the settlement of liens, and to instead litigate all liens. 339 Lastly, the
defendants were accused of communicating among themselves and with
other insurers and employers through secret or public means. 340
As with most antitrust suits, the basis of Wellington's antitrust suit was
largely premised on circumstantial evidence such as conversations with the
various defendant insurance companies. 341 For example, a Zenith attorney
allegedly stated that Zenith was tired of the large size of Wellington's bills
and was joining with other insurers to refuse to pay any bills for medical-
legal evaluations and treatment submitted by Wellington and further
334. Id. at 7.
335. Id. at 8-9.
336. Id. at 8. It was alleged that Zenith declared their intent to continue this practice, even though it was
a departure from general industry practice. Id.
337. Id. Wellington alleged that the defendants would tacitly contest the claims as being fraudulent or
false, even though Zenith had no knowledge of the merits of the particular claims. Id.
338. Id. at 8-9. This practice was a severe handicap to Wellington, since the medical clinic had historically
obtained most revenues from telephone negotiations with Zenith's claims personnel. Id. See supra notes 277-283
and accompanying text (discussing the concept of "conscious parallelism").
339. Princeton Complaint, supra note 20, at 9. Wellington alleged that this practice of "sham" litigation
was an attempt to create publicity harmful to Wellington. Id.
340. Id. Wellington specifically mentioned a sponsored supplement in the October 28, 1991 Los Angeles
Business Journal, written by a lawyer for Zenith which attacks forensic medical clinics and states that the
insurance industry is contemplating taking action to eliminate the profit in evaluating and treating psychiatric
injuries. Id.
341. Princeton Complaint, supra note 20, at 10-11.
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intended to litigate all cases rather than agreeing on settlements 42
Similar allegations were leveled at the other defendants, in which the
insurance companies stated that they would not pay any medical-legal
evaluations submitted by Wellington unless by judicial order.343
The turning point in the case came from a minute order issued by
Judge Harry L. Hupp, in which the Wellington plaintiffs were told to drop
their per se violation theory." Judge Hupp stated that, in his opinion,
the per se violation would apply only if the defendants were in competition
with the plaintiff.345  Since the plaintiffs were medical care providers,
rather than insurers, the actions of the insurance company defendants did
not impact competition.346 Further, he stated that the "boycott" alleged
was also not intended to affect competition among psychiatrists and
psychologists specializing in writing workers' compensation reports.3 7
It was not readily apparent how competition in the psychiatric report
business would be harmed by a group decision requiring the report writer
to establish the validity of reports.S With the per se theory dropped, the
case would be analyzed under the Rule of Reason.349 The great expense
involved in litigating an antitrust suit under the Rule of Reason 350 was
instrumental in prompting Wellington to seek an out-of-court settlement
with Zenith.351
342. Id. at 10.
343. Id. at 10-1 . Zenith allegedly stated that its new policy was to object to 99% of liens and maintain
this objection until the workers' compensation case was settled, thereby refusing to pay for Wellington's
medical-legal evaluation and treatment expenses prior to settlement of the workers' compensation case. Id. at
1I. The complaint also stated that, since litigation of a claim can take several years, a delay in payment or
settlement of Wellington's liens until after completion of litigation would put them out of business. ld.
344. Princeton Medical Corp., et al. v. Zenith Ins. Co., et al., No. CV 91-6866-HLH (C.D. Cal. filed May
18, 1992) (order denying motion to dismiss amended complaint) (copy on file with the Pacific Law Journal).
345. Id.; see supra notes 288-292 and accompanying text (discussing the per se theory, and its general
confinement to those types of conduct which obviously adversely affect competition).
346. Princeton Medical Corp., et al. v. Zenith Ins. Co., at al., No. CV 91-6866-HLH (Cent. D. Cal May
18, 1992).
347. Id.
348. Id.
349. Id.
350. See supra notes 293-298 and accompanying text (discussing the detailed analysis which a plaintiff
must undergo in proving the unreasonableness of conduct analyzed under the Rule of Reason).
351. Telephone Interview with Donald G. Norris, Partner of Burton & Norris, attorneys for the Wellington
plaintiffs (July 1, 1993) (stating that the lawsuit became prohibitively expensive after the plaintiffs were advised
to drop their per se violation theory) (copy on file with the Pacific Law Journal); see Zenith Insurance Co.
Reaches Settlement, supra note 307 (reporting on the settlement terms between Zenith and APC, and stating that
Zenith had also settled with Dr. Byron Crawford and Wellington Medical Group).
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C. Resolution of the Zenith and Wellington Suits
Prior to reaching a verdict in either the Zenith civil RICO suit or the
Wellington antitrust suit, an out-of-court settlement between Zenith and
Wellington was announced in which Zenith dismissed their RICO actions
against all of the defendants in return for the dismissal of over $1.6 million
in suspected fraudulent lien claims. 52  In addition to dropping the
antitrust suit against Zenith, Wellington agreed to pay Zenith an
undisclosed amount of cash, and to substantially alter their business
protocols in further dealings with Zenith.353
The business protocols to which Wellington agreed pertained to
advertising format, medical-legal evaluations, disclosure of quarterly
financial statements, and the ratio of comprehensive examinations
performed in relation to more limited exams.354 Wellington agreed that
all further advertising would state the penalties for defrauding the workers'
compensation system, as well as the rights of employers to control
treatment and investigate workers' compensation claims.35 5 Only one
initial medical-legal evaluation per person would be paid, unless prior
written consent had been obtained from Zenith.356 Time constraints were
placed on when medical-legal evaluations or treatment could be
performed. 7  Wellington agreed that treatment and evaluation costs
would strictly adhere to the established statutory medical fee
schedules. 35 8 Further, Wellington agreed to include on each bill the
names of, and amount of time spent by, all employees who performed the
352. Seliement, supra note 307.
353. Id.; see infra notes 354-360 and accompanying text (discussing the business practices which
Wellington agreed to alter in return for Zenith's moving for dismissal of the civil RICO complaint).
354. Settlement, supra note 307.
355. Id. The statement of penalties for making false claims must be in 12-point boldface type. Id. The
advertisements must state that the dmployer has the right to control treatment in connection with workers'
compensation claims for up to 30 days and to investigate such claims for up to 90 days. id.
356. Id.
357. Id. Zenith would not have to pay for medical treatment if the treatment was provided prior to the
earlier of 30 days from receipt by the employer of notice of a workers' compensation claim or notice that Zenith
had denied the claim. Id. Further, Zenith would not pay for medical-legal evaluations performed prior to the
earlier of 90 days from Zenith's receipt of the claim or Zenith's denial of the claim for benefits. Id. See supra
note 90-94 and accompanying text (discussing recently enacted California Labor Code §§ 4060, 4621, which
make significant changes in the laws pertaining to medical-legal evaluations arising from workers' compensation
claims)..
358. See CAL. LAB. CODE § 4628(a)-fj) (West Supp. 1993) (setting forth the requirements for preparation
of medical report and payment schedules for doctors examining injured employees).
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work being billed. 9 Lastly, Wellington would provide Zenith with
annual financial statements as well as quarterly statistics regarding the
number of comprehensive examinations performed in relation to more
limited levels of examination.3' The lopsided out-of-court settlement
indicates the power of civil RICO in combatting fraudulent workers'
compensation mills.
IV. RAMIFICATIONS AND SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER ACTION
There is no disputing the fact that workers' compensation mills pose
a serious threat to the continued viability of California's workers'
compensation system. Nor is there dispute surrounding the fact that a
significant number of claims by workers are fraudulent--as high as thirty
percent by some estimates.3 61 The recent enactment of several workers'
compensation reform bills3 62 demonstrates the California Legislature's
commitment to resolve the crisis which exists within the workers'
compensation system. To be sure, this reform legislation will reduce the
number of medical-legal evaluations and stress claims which currently
engulf the system. Nevertheless, there are many sources of fraud within the
workers' compensation system which this legislation does not address.363
It is not the purpose of this Comment to sympathize with the reprehensible
conduct of fraudulent workers' compensation mills, or the workers who
knowingly submit fraudulent claims. Rather, this Comment considers an
inequity in the law which may be exploited by workers' compensation
insurers as a low-risk means of prolonging or denying payment of
legitimate claims. Assuming arguendo that twenty to thirty percent of all
claims are indeed fraudulent, 364 then seventy to eighty percent of all
workers' compensation claims are legitimate. In order to assure the
continued protection of the rights of this legitimate majority of claimants
359. "Senlement, supra note 307. Each bill would also contain a statement under penalty of perjury
regarding the accuracy of the amount of time spent by each person. Id.
360. Id.
361. CONTAINING THE COSTS, supra note 2, at 78-79 (reporting that the Council on California
Competitiveness estimates that as much as 30% of employee claims are fraudulent, while major insurers estimate
that 20% of such claims are fraudulent).
362. See supra notes 156-164 and accompanying text (discussing the new workers' compensation reform
legislation).
363. See supra notes 50-105 and accompanying text (discussing the various sources of fraud which exist
within the workers' compensation system).
364. See CONTAINING THE CosTs, supra note 2, at 78 (estimating that 20 to 30% of all workers'
compensation claims are fraudulent).
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to receive prompt payment of benefits, it is essential that the Legislature
address every possible type of fraud which might occur. Given the fact that
the workers' compensation system is largely self-regulating, 65 the
critical equilibrium may be upset by an imbalance in liability between
various participants in the system.
A. Workers' Compensation Insurers Have Minimal Risk of Treble
Damages Liability
The expansion of civil RICO to the workers' compensation system has
proven itself as a cost-effective weapon for insurance companies to use
against fraudulent claimants.3" By consolidating all of their claims into
a single suit, less funds are spent on litigating, which ideally translates into
more benefits for deserving injured workers. The treble damages remedy
available to a successful civil RICO plaintiff serves as a powerful
inducement for a defendant workers' compensation mill to settle out of
court, thereby shortening the length of time the plaintiff must spend on the
case and saving the workers' compensation system even more money.
In the event that a group of workers' compensation insurance
companies engage in fraudulent non-payment of legitimate claims which
would otherwise meet all the requirements of a RICO violation, they
cannot be held liable for such conduct under the precedent set by American
International Group, Inc. v. Superior Court.3 67 Instead, the only treble-
damages remedy which would apply to these insurers would be a common
law antitrust suit. As has been illustrated. above, such a suit would be
prohibitively expensive to bring due to the necessity of analyzing the
complaint under the Rule of Reason.368 Since no other applicable cause
of action exists which carries a treble damages remedy, workers'
compensation insurers bear little risk of such liability.
365. HERICK, supra note 26, at 1-2.
366. See supra note 352-360 and accompanying text (discussing the favorable settlement terms of the civil
RICO suit brought by Zenith).
367. 234 Cal. App. 3d 749, 285 Cal. Rptr. 765 (1991). See supra notes 207-216 and accompanying text
(discussing the American Intl Group case).
368. See supra notes 294-298 and accompanying text (discussing the lengthy analysis required under the
Rule of Reason doctrine).
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B. An Incentive For Fraudulent Nonpayment of Legitimate Claims
Exists Among Workers' Compensation Insurers
To those who believe that all workers' compensation insurers
stringently adhere to the "prompt payment" policy of the workers'
compensation system, the minimal risk of treble damages liability to
workers' compensation insurers is a non-issue. Yet, while insurers
characterize the medical clinics as being the main source of fraud within
the workers' compensation system, they themselves are not above
reproach. A recent investigation by the Los Angeles county district
attorney's office concerns a suspected kickback scheme between a medical
referral firm and insurance administrators who agreed to use their
doctors.369 While this may simply be an isolated occurrence, it may also
be the tip of the iceberg. When one considers the fact that the premiums
which a workers' compensation insurer collects from employers are
invested in various financial endeavors, it becomes evident that, like any
investor, the workers' compensation insurance industry is subject to the
cyclical nature of our economy.370 The impending change from a
guaranteed profit system to a competitive system371 will encourage
insurers to lower their rates as much as possible in order to remain
competitive. A logical method of balancing this reduction in rates is a
reduction in the number of claims paid. Given the lower return on
investments during a recession, the current economic climate in California
engenders the practice of denying payment of legitimate claims.
It is assumed that the vast majority of workers' compensation insurers
would be above allowing a sluggish economy, such as the one currently
being experienced in California, to dictate their policy of claim payment.
369. Stuart Silverstein, Unusual Fraud Probe Focuses on Insurers' Side of Workers' Conip, L.A. TIMES,
Aug. 4, 1993, Part D at 1, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, LAT File. The referral finn, L.A. Management,
acted as a middleman between doctors and administrators who handle workers' compensation claims for some
employers and insurance companies. Id. Under the alleged scheme, doctors and medical clinics sent bills to the
referral firm, whereupon L.A. Management would improperly inflate the medical charges, pass them on to the
administrator, and these inflated bills would ultimately be paid by the employer. Id. The investigation concerns
how L.A. Management secured its business from the insurance administrators, and whether they paid kickbacks
to the administrators or the insurance companies the administrators serve. Id.
370. See generally Patricia K. Lundvall, The Rise and Fall of the Antitrust Eemption for the Business of
histrance, MCGEORGE SCHOOL OF LAW CENTER FOR RESEARCH (John Stauffer Charitable Trust Comment on
the Law Series, June 1989) (discussing the intimate relationship between insurance industry practices and market
fluctuations). While the Lundvall article refers specifically to property/casualty insurance, the economic
principles described therein would apply to any investment portfolio.
371. See supra notes 113-114 and accompanying text (noting that recent legislation mandates enactment
of a competitive system of workers' compensation insurance on January 1, 1995).
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Nevertheless, the possibility exists for just such a practice. An insurer is
obviously justified in refusing to pay fraudulent claims, however there is
little risk involved to an insurance company which takes this practice a
step further by adopting a policy of non-payment of all but the most
routine claims. Aside from the much maligned "soft-tissue" injuries, there
are many types of legitimate injuries which are routinely missed in cursory
exams and could, therefore, be suspected as fraudulent. Detection of many
injuries requires more extensive diagnostic exams, which are not ordinarily
prescribed. While a practice of denying or delaying payment of these non-
routine claims would likely reduce payment of fraudulent claims, it would
also reduce payment of legitimate claims. Given the prompt payment
policy of the workers' compensation system, such a practice goes too far.
In the event that the Legislature decides to address this dangerous
situation, there are various measures available: (1) Enactment of a "little
RICO" statute, or a statutory treble damages penalty for fraudulent
workers' compensation insurers; (2) a mandate that workers' compensation
insurers adhere to a state-sponsored antitrust compliance program; and (3)
a provision for proceedings before the Workers' Compensation Appeals
Board to determine separate payment schedules for suspect claimants.
1. California Should Include a Civil Cause of Action In The
State's "Little RICO" Statute
In declining to apply federal civil RICO liability to the insurance
industry, the American International Group372 court cited section 1012(b)
of the McCarran-Ferguson Act, which states that no Act of Congress may
supersede any State law for the purpose of regulating the business of
insurance (unless the Act specifically relates to the business of
insurance).373 This effectively places the regulation of the insurance
industry on the shoulders of the state. In order to provide a treble damages
remedy outside the confines of antitrust law, the California Legislature
should adopt a civil RICO cause of action which specifically applies to the
insurance industry. This type of statute would avoid the anticompetitive
confines of antitrust law. A "little RICO" statute which provides a civil
cause of action against those who form an enterprise for the purpose of
engaging in a pattern of racketeering activity would enable a plaintiff to
372. 234 Cal. App. 3d 749, 285 Cal. Rptr. 765 (1991).
373. Id. at 768, 777; see 15 U.S.C. § 1012(b) (barring an Act of Congress from superseding any State law
for the purpose of regulating the business of insurance).
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sue in state court, rather than federal court. By including within the
definition of racketeering activity the offense of fraudulent withholding of
payment by an insurance company, the risk that workers' compensation
insurers will engage in a pattern of conduct such as that alleged in the
Wellington complaint would be reduced. Given California's dismal record
in terms of the amount of benefits which actually reach injured
workers,374 a state court would likely be more sympathetic to such a
plaintiff.
In the event that the Legislature desires to remain consistent with
federal law and preclude insurance companies from liability under the
federal RICO Act,375 the Legislature can simply enact a statute which
provides a treble damage remedy to a plaintiff who proves injury as a
result of fraudulent payment practices by a workers' compensation insurer.
2. Mandatory State-Sponsored Antitrust Compliance Programs
Antitrust compliance programs are a fact of life in the modem business
world. Simply put, they are internal guidelines established by a company
which govern the conduct of the company's employees. By giving the
employees firm parameters within which to perform, it is believed that
productivity is enhanced because the employee no longer fears crossing the
line between aggressive (but legal) business practices, and conduct which
is illegal.376  While the traditional exemption of the workers'
compensation insurance industry from antitrust law has never given rise to
the need for an antitrust compliance program, the recent advent of fraud
in the workers' compensation system has raised the stakes in the insurance
industry significantly.
Since the workers' compensation industry is already subject to
extensive regulation by the state, it is not unreasonable for the state
Legislature to sponsor a detailed antitrust compliance program which
applies to all workers' compensation insurers. Given the recent legislation
which enables construction industry employers to provide workers'
compensation altogether outside the state workers' compensation
374. See Thornton, supra note 11 (noting that California ranks 47th out of 50 states in terms of the amount
of benefits paid to injured workers).
375. See supra notes 207-216 and accompanying text (discussing the American Int'l Group case, which
refused to apply RICO to the insurance industry).
376. VALKER B. COMEGYS, ANTITRUST COMPLIANCE MANUAL-A GUIDE FOR COUNSEL AND EXECUTIVES
OF BUSINESSES AND PROFESSIONS, 349 (2d ed. 1992).
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system,377 the need for firm antitrust guidelines is certainly timely. By
setting forth specific guidelines regarding communication between insurers,
the risk of conduct such as that alleged in the Wellington complaint is
minimized. A plaintiff who is able to prove conduct which falls outside of
the established antitrust compliance program would be much more likely
to be scrutinized under the per se doctrine, thereby enhancing the
likelihood of a successful antitrust suit.
3. Administrative Hearings to Determine Payment Schedules for
Suspicious Claims
While some medical care providers may actually be submitting
universally fraudulent claims, the more likely scenario is that some claims
are fraudulent, while others are legitimate. An insurer who arbitrarily
withholds payment from a suspected workers' compensation mill may
actually be denying valid claims along with fraudulent claims. In light of
the strong possibility that most claims submitted by a specific workers'
compensation mill are fraudulent, equity might say that just such a practice
of arbitrary withholding of payment is exactly what the suspected workers'
compensation mill deserves. Such reasoning misses the point, since this
type of practice forces the legitimately injured worker to suffer for the sins
of the medical care provider.
The California Insurance Commissioner could ensure the protection of
legitimate claimants and diminish the rampant fraud currently infesting our
workers' compensation system by establishing a "Registry of Suspicious
Claimants." Medical care providers who are placed on this list would be
required to justify the legitimacy of each claim to the insurer prior to
payment by the insurance company. Placement in this registry could be
done in an administrative hearing before the Workers' Compensation
Appeals Board where the insurance company would be allowed to present
evidence that, for example, thirty-five percent of a particular provider's
claims were suspicious. 378 The medical provider would be given the
opportunity to dispute the allegations, and the decision of the Workers'
Compensation Appeals Board would be final.379 Such a process would
377. See supra notes 34-37 (describing newly enacted Chapter 117).
378. In the event of an administrative finding of actual fraud, the appropriate licensing board should be
notified so that a determination might be made as to whether there were adequate grounds to revoke the medical
provider's license to practice medicine.
379. Once a provider has been deemed a Suspicious Claimant, provisions should be in place for a similar
hearing whereby the suspect provider can petition to be removed from this registry.
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serve to protect consumers from insurance company abuses while allowing
for a more efficient method of reducing fraudulent claims. Because the
suspicious claimants would have to prove the legitimacy of each claim
before it was paid, rather than the insurer being required to prove the
illegitimacy of the claim, the burden is shifted away from insurers, thereby
reducing the costs to the workers' compensation system.
V. CONCLUSION
Given the fact that the workers' compensation system is largely self-
regulating, the legal advantage currently enjoyed by the workers'
compensation insurance industry is not necessarily a bad thing. In the
event that insurance companies are only combatting fraudulent claimants,
such an uneven playing field is only beneficial to the system so long as the
insurers do not abuse their power. From a policy standpoint, there is
nothing wrong with a group of insurers getting together and adopting
310lawful procedures to fight fraudulent claimants. Indeed, reducing the
amount of fraudulent claims would benefit the entire workers'
compensation industry, and boost California's sagging economy at the
same time. The antitrust exemption of the business of insurance allows for
3811the exchange of information relating to falsified claims, even though
this type of communication would be a violation of antitrust law in any
other business. The concern is that the antitrust exemption, combined with
an absence of RICO liability, makes it too easy for workers' compensation
insurers to forget the distinction between profitable objectives and
antifraud objectives.
Workers' compensation fraud is such a hot topic that a very obvious
truth is easily overlooked: Most workers' compensation claims are
legitimate. The risk created by the imbalance in treble damage liability is
that workers' compensation insurers might engage in the type of conduct
alleged in the Wellington complaint against large volume claimants, as
well as fraudulent claimants. In this instance, legitimate consumers are
injured. Given California's current position as forty-seventh in terms of
380. It has long been established that a desire to drive fraudulent people from business does not justify
using unlawful means to accomplish this otherwise laudable objective. See, e.g., Standard Sanitary Mfg. Co. v.
United States, 226 U.S. 20, 49 (1912) (stating that good intentions or good results do not justify deviation from
the law); Paramount Famous Lasky Corp. v. United States, 282 U.S. 30, 43 (1930) (stating that otherwise
laudable motives to put unscrupulous people out of business do not excuse unlawful means).
381. See supra notes 266-272 and accompanying text (discussing the antitrust exemption provided the
business of insurance).
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workers' compensation efficiency, we cannot afford to injure honest
consumers any further. If the California Legislature is as committed to
cleaning up the workers' compensation system as they would have voters
believe, then they should adopt the types of reforms advocated in this
Comment. Such reforms would only threaten insurers who engage in
fraudulent payment practices. By adopting a more viable treble damage
remedy than that which is currently available under antitrust law, the
Legislature would be creating a level playing field for all sectors of the
workers' compensation system, thus ensuring that injured workers receive
the compensation that they rightfully deserve.
Daniel T. Fitzpatrick
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